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In June 2015, the United States Supreme Court granted the State of
Mississippi leave to file a bill of complaint against the State of
Tennessee, the City of Memphis, and Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Division for wrongfully converting groundwater from the interstate
Sparta-Memphis Aquifer. The dispute arises from Memphis and its
municipal utility pumping groundwater within Tennessee, which
Mississippi alleges has lowered the water tables within its territory. The
Supreme Court's grant of leave raises for the first time the question of
what legal doctrine applies to transboundary interstate groundwater
resources. Tennessee and lower courts would subject interstate
groundwater to the Court's equitable apportionment doctrine, which
divides and allocates interstate surface waters by determining the best
overall utility for the water supply with a heavy emphasis on protecting
existing consumptive uses. Mississippi's bill of complaint seeks
damages and declaratory relief based on property theories of absolute
right, title, and exclusive possessory ownership of groundwater located
within its territorial borders. This article offers a third alternative, the
Supreme Court's doctrine of interstate nuisance, which recognizes and
balances competing sovereign interests in utilization and preservation of
shared interstate natural resources.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The Sparta-Memphis Aquifer straddles the Mississippi-Tennessee
border and is the primary water supply for the City of Memphis.1 As
Memphis and its municipal utility, Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Division, have increased pumping from this shared aquifer, the State of
Mississippi has objected and complained about declining water tables
within its territory.2 The dispute worked its way up and down the federal
court system until June 2015, when the United States Supreme Court
granted the State of Mississippi leave to file a bill of complaint against
the State of Tennessee, the City of Memphis, and Memphis Light, Gas
& Water Division for wrongfully converting groundwater from the
interstate Sparta-Memphis Aquifer.' Prior to the Supreme Court's grant
of leave, lower courts and scholars (including the co-author of this
article) assumed that interstate groundwater resources are subject to the
Supreme Court's equitable apportionment doctrine, which settles state
interests in shared waters by determining the best overall utility for the
water supply.4 Mississippi's bill of complaint, however, frames a state's
interest in water differently: it seeks damages and declaratory relief
based on property theories of absolute right, title, and exclusive
I See Brian Waldron and Daniel Larsen, Pre-Development Groundwater Conditions
Surrounding Memphis, Tennessee: Controversy and Unexpected Outcomes, 1 J. AM. WATER
RESOURCES ASS'N 133-35 (2014); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Mississippi v.
Tennessee, No. 220143 (U.S. May 12, 2015).
2 See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 627 28 (5th Cir. 2009).
3 See Docket of Case No. 220143, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
http://www.supremecourt.gov/Search.aspx?FileName=/docketfiles/22o143.htm (last visited Mar.
6,2016).
4 Hood, 570 F.3d at 629 31; Noah D. Hall & Benjamin L. Cavataro, Interstate Groundwater
Law in the Snake Valley: Equitable Apportionment and a New Model for Transboundary Aquifer
Management, 6 UTAH L. REV. 1553 (2013).
2016]
154 Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 34:152
possessory ownership of groundwater within its territorial borders.5
Thus, the Supreme Court must decide, as a matter of first impression,
the law of interstate groundwater use and prior holdings and
scholarship must be revisited.
This is not the first time Mississippi has brought this issue to the
Court seeking damages based on a theory of property ownership for
waters within its borders. In 2010 the Court refused to hear
Mississippi's claims,6 letting stand a lower court ruling that the Sparta-
Memphis Aquifer must be equitably apportioned before any action for
damages could proceed.' By declining leave in 2010, the Court left
Mississippi to pursue a claim under the equitable apportionment
doctrine to establish its share of the interstate groundwater, just as it
would for interstate surface waters.' The Court's grant of leave in 2015
seems to signals a reversal of its 2010 position, opening the door to
Mississippi's arguments of absolute ownership of the groundwater
located within its state borders. This article respects the Court's grant of
leave but suggests another compelling and well-established alternative
to Mississippi's absolutist property ownership theories the Supreme
Court's doctrine of interstate nuisance. Interstate nuisance addresses
harms to natural resources that cross state boundaries, recognizing the
need to balance competing sovereign interests in utilization and
preservation of such resources.9 The Supreme Court has used interstate
nuisance to address transboundary pollution and other physical harms."l
Even more applicably, it has relied on the doctrine of interstate nuisance
to resolve complaints of harm to neighboring states' interests from
municipal water use of the Great Lakes,11 a water resource that in nature
and importance has many analogies to the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II provides a background on the
Sparta-Memphis Aquifer dispute and the prior Mississippi v. City of
Memphis litigation. Part III examines the character of state title to
5 The State of Mississippi's Motion for Leave to File Bill of Complaint in Original Action,
Complaint, and Brief in Support of Motion at 23 24, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 220143, (U.S.
June 10, 2014), 2014 WL 5319728, at *23 *24 [hereinafter Complaint] (prayer for relief).
6 Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010).
7 Hood, 570 F.3d at 629 30, 633.
8 See generally Hall & Cavataro, supra note 4, at 1608 11.
9 See Noah D. Hall, Transboundary Pollution: Harmonizing International and Domestic Law,
40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 681, 690 91 (2007).
10 See, e.g., Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co.,
206 U.S. 230 (1907); Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208
(1901).
I Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967);
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930); Wisconsin
v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
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waters, which are better understood through the public trust doctrine
rather than the fiction of state ownership of water. Part IV considers
how Mississippi's theory of groundwater ownership is equally defective
under state water law concepts, which have overwhelmingly rejected
absolute ownership in favor of doctrines such as correlative rights that
balance the harms and benefits of groundwater use. Finally, Parts V and
VI consider possible doctrines which the Court may use to settle
interstate groundwater disputes: equitable apportionment and interstate
nuisance, respectively.
II. THE SPARTA-MEMPHIS AQUIFER DISPUTE AND PRIOR LITIGATION
Given the growing demand for and utilization of groundwater,
interstate disputes over this resource are inevitable. While overall water
consumption in the United States has stayed flat for several decades,12
the competing demands for surface water including maintaining in-
stream flows and other environmental protections have increased
pressure on groundwater resources.13  Since 1950, groundwater
withdrawals have more than doubled from 34 billion gallons
(128,704,000 M3 ) per day to 76 billion gallons (287,691,296 M3 ) per day
in 2010.14 Groundwater now provides over one-fifth of the freshwater
used in the United States. 15 Groundwater offers water users several
advantages over surface water. It is widely available, less vulnerable to
environmental pollution, and often suitable for drinking with minimal
treatment. 16 Further, groundwater is not subject to competing demands
for navigation, recreational use, and fishery habitats.17
Historically, groundwater use was almost exclusively a matter of
state law.1" But with increased utilization of groundwater, interstate
12 JOAN F. KENNY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN
THE UNITED STATES rN 2005, at 1 2 (2009).
13 See generally Robert H. Abrams & Noah D. Hall, Framing Water Policy in a Carbon
Affected and Carbon Constrained Environment, 50 NAT. RESOURCES J. 3 (2010).
14 MOLLY A. MAUPIN ET AL., ESTIMATED USE OF WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2010, at
45(2014).
15 Id. (noting that approximately 355 billion gallons of freshwater were withdrawn each day in
2010, of which 76 billion gallons were groundwater).
16 See ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., MODERN WATER LAW: PRIVATE PROPERTY, PUBLIC
RIGHTS, AND ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONS 173 75 (2013).
17 See Abrams & Hall, supra note 13, at 10 11.
18 CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, How FEDERAL POLICIES AFFECT THE ALLOCATION OF WATER 4
(2006) ("For interstate groundwater, the laws of each state govern access to and use of an
aquifer's resources withdrawn in its jurisdiction .... even for the largest aquifer crossing state
boundaries the High Plains aquifer, which extends over 174,000 square miles and involves eight
states .... "); Dean Baxtresser, Note, Antiques Roadshow: The Common Law and the Coming
Age of Groundwater Marketing, 108 MICH. L. REV. 773, 788 n.69 (2010) ("As a whole, federal
law rarely interferes with groundwater allocation at the state level .... ").
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conflicts over the use of transboundary groundwater resources are
emerging around the country. The ongoing dispute over the Snake
Valley Aquifer, pitting the water needs of Las Vegas against
environmental and agricultural interests in Utah, is a telling example.19
But while interstate water disputes are part of life in the arid West, the
East has now taken the lead with the first interstate groundwater case
before the U.S. Supreme Court.
The dispute between Mississippi and Tennessee centers on the use of
the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer by the city of Memphis for its municipal
public water supply. The Sparta-Memphis Aquifer sits in northwest
Mississippi and southwest Tennessee and is part of the Mississippi
embayment aquifer system, a sedimentary basin that reaches across nine
states in the south-central United States.2" The City of Memphis and
Memphis Light, Gas and Water ("MLGW") are located in Shelby
County, Tennessee, along the border of Mississippi and Arkansas.
Memphis began withdrawing groundwater from the Aquifer for
municipal use in 1886, and the Aquifer has thus supplied drinking water
throughout the region for over a century.21 Recently, water from the
Aquifer has been increasingly used for irrigation and industrial
purposes.22
MLGW is the utility responsible for providing water, gas and
electricity to residents of Memphis and Shelby County in Tennessee. It
is the largest three-service utility provider in the country and serves
nearly 421,000 customers overall.24 MLGW's current water operations
include over 175 wells in ten separate well fields and provides drinking
water to over 257,000 customers. MLGW relies solely on
groundwater, specifically the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer, as its source of
drinking water.26 Memphis's heavy reliance on groundwater is second
only to San Antonio, Texas, among the nation's cities that depend solely
on groundwater for municipal water supply.27
19 See generally Hall & Cavataro, supra note 4.
20 Waldron & Larsen, supra note 1, at 133 35.
21 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1; BRIAN R. CLARK ET AL., USGS
PROFESSIONAL PAPER 1785, GROUNDWATER AVAILABILITY OF THE MISSISSIPPI EMBAYMENT
1 2, 8,11(2011).
22 CLARK ET AL., supra note 21, at 8.
23 About, MEMPHIS LIGHT, GAS, AND WATER, http://www.mlgw.com/about/ (last visited Mar.
6, 2016).
24 Id.
25 Id.
26 Jd.; CLARK ET AL., supra note 21 at 8.
27 J.V. BRAHANA & R.E. BROSHEARS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-RESOURCES
INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 89-4131, HYDROGEOLOGY AND GROUND-WATER FLOW IN THE
MEMPHIS AND FORT PILLOW AQUIFERS IN THE MEMPHIS AREA, TENNESSEE, 2 (2001).
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Groundwater withdrawals from the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer in
Shelby County have grown dramatically over time. Between 1886 and
1975, groundwater withdrawals increased from less than about 10
million gallons (38,000 M 3 ) to over 179 million gallons (681,000 M 3)
per day.2" Over the next twenty years, from 1975 to 1995, withdrawals
plateaued averaging almost 166 million gallons (628,000 M 3) per day.29
By 2005, however, withdrawals increased again to over 187 million
gallons (710,000 M 3 ) per day." This high volume water consumption is
not surprising, given that Shelby County is the largest county in
Tennessee in terms of both geographic size and population. 1 Further,
the county is home to Memphis, the most populous city in the state.
Over the last forty-five years the population of the county has increased
by over 200,000 citizens,32 which has contributed to the increased
demand for groundwater from the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer.
After decades of allegedly pumping water at rates much higher than
that of the Aquifer's "natural seepage rate," Mississippi has claimed that
MLGW made permanent, harmful changes to a vital source of
groundwater to the state.3 Mississippi maintains that the extensive
pumping to supply water to Memphis has allegedly diverted water from
Mississippi's portion of the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer. 4
The alleged change in gradient from Mississippi to the Memphis area
spurred Mississippi's attorney general to file a lawsuit against Memphis
in 2007 in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Mississippi. 5 Mississippi claimed that the water held in its portion of
the Aquifer is the state's sovereign property3 6 and that this water has
28 JAMES H. CRINER AND WILLIAM SCOTT PARKS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-
RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 76-67, HISTORIC WATER-LEVEL CHANGES AND PUMPAGE
FROM THE PRINCIPAL AQUIFERS OF THE MEMPHIS AREA, TENNESSEE: 1886-1975, at 1 2, 36 38
(1976).
29 SUSAN S. HUTSON & A. JANNINE MORRIS, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-
RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 91-4195, PUBLIC WATER-SUPPLY SYSTEMS AND WATER
USE IN TENNESSEE: 1988, at 1, 9 (1992); SUSAN S. HUTSON, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
WATER-RESOURCES INVESTIGATIONS REPORT 99-4052, PUBLIC WATER-SUPPLY SYSTEMS AND
ASSOCIATED WATER USE IN TENNESSEE: 1995, at 1, 10 11 (1999).
30 JOAN F. KENNY ET AL., U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, CIRCULAR 1344, ESTIMATED USE OF
WATER IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2005 (2009) (ground-water withdrawals for Shelby County can
be found under the county's FIPS code, which is 157).
31 QuickFacts: Shelby County, Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.census.gov/
qfd/states/47/47157.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2016).
32 Id.
33 Complaint, supra note 5, at 23 24.
34 Complaint, supra note 5, at 24.
35 Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 533 F. Supp. 2d 646, 648 (N.D. Miss. 2008).
36 Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 627 (5th Cir. 2009)
("Mississippi alleges that part of the groundwater that Memphis pumps from the Aquifer is
Mississippi's sovereign property and that the state must therefore be compensated.").
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been taken by Memphis drawing more water than was naturally
replenished." Mississippi sought compensation in the form of past and
future damages, and equitable relief.8
An initial procedural issue before the district court was the City of
Memphis's attempt to join the State of Tennessee as a defendant party.39
Mississippi opposed and disputed the joinder.4' The district court ruled
that Tennessee was a necessary and indispensable party, but that it did
not have the jurisdiction to join the state. 41 The court reasoned that
joining Tennessee was necessary "because in its absence complete relief
cannot be accorded among those already parties to the action. 4
The district court ultimately rejected Mississippi's claim that only
Mississippi water was involved in the lawsuit,43 stating relief could not
be granted until it was determined "which portion of the Aquifer's water
is the property of which State."' The court cited the Supreme Court's
precedent of applying equitable apportionment for resolving interstate
water disputes, concluding that the Supreme Court would have to
apportion the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer between the two states. 45
Because the Supreme Court has original and exclusive jurisdiction
for controversies between two or more states,46 the district court
reasoned that Mississippi would have an adequate remedy if the action
were dismissed because the state would be able "to petition the Supreme
Court for apportionment of the waters of the Memphis Sands Aquifer in
a suit that properly joins ... the State of Tennessee. '4 Since not joining
Tennessee would result in extreme prejudice, and there were still
options available to the plaintiffs, the district court dismissed the case
without prejudice. 4' As only the Supreme Court has exclusive
jurisdiction for disputes between states, 49 the opinion intimated that
Mississippi should pursue the action through this channel.50
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 627 628.
40 Id. at 628.
41 Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 533 F. Supp. 2d 646, 649, 651 (N.D. Miss.
2008).
42 Id. at 649.
43 Id.
44 Id. at 648 (citations omitted).
45 Id.
46 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a) (2012).
47 Hood, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
48 Id.at 651.
49 28 U.S.C. § 125 1(a).
50 Hood, 533 F. Supp. 2d at 650.
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Instead, Mississippi appealed to the Fifth Circuit the district court's
ruling to dismiss the case.51 Mississippi again argued that Tennessee
was not an indispensable party because the suit did not involve
Tennessee's sovereign interests.52 Mississippi further argued against
equitable apportionment of the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer, claiming that
it owned the groundwater resources within its sovereign territory.53
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court and held that the Sparta-
Memphis Aquifer was an interstate water source and that allocation of
the resource must happen "before one state may sue an entity for
invading its share."54 The court rejected the argument that Mississippi
owned a "fixed resource" interest in the Aquifer water, stating that
water "is not a fixed resource like a mineral seam, but instead migrates
across state boundaries."55 The Fifth Circuit pointed to Supreme Court
precedent that ruled that state boundaries do not determine the amount
of water a state is entitled to in regards to an interstate source.5 6 Thus,
the court concluded that the aquifer had to be allocated like other
interstate water sources that were subject to multistate disputes:
The fact that this particular water source is located underground,
as opposed to resting above ground.., is of no analytical
significance. The Aquifer flows, if slowly, under several states,
and it is indistinguishable from a lake bordered by multiple
states or from a river bordering several states depending upon it
for water.57
The Fifth Circuit concluded that "a judgment rendered in Tennessee's
absence would be enormously prejudicial to Tennessee's sovereign
interest in its water rights"58 and that Mississippi would still have an
adequate remedy, by petitioning the Supreme Court, if the suit were
dismissed.59 Following this decision, Mississippi filed a petition for writ
of certiorari to the Supreme Court.6' Again Mississippi argued that the
groundwater was not a shared natural resource and that equitable
apportionment was not required, nor appropriate for the pursued action:
since Mississippi was not challenging Tennessee's "sovereignty over
51 Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 625 (5th Cir. 2009).
52 Id. at 629.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 629 30 (citing Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92
(1938)).
55 Id. at 630.
56 Id. at 630 31.
57 Id. at 630.
58 Id. at 633.
59 Id.
60 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 130 S.Ct. 1319 (2010) (No.
09-289).
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groundwater within" the state, and Tennessee had not moved to
intervene, then there was no controversy between the states.6 1
Mississippi also contended that their own statutory and legal authority
gave them authority over both ground and surface waters within
Mississippi state boundaries. 62 The Supreme Court denied certiorari in
2010,63 which seemed to finally put to rest the notion of the state's
absolute ownership of groundwater.
Following the Supreme Court's denial of certiorari in 2010,
Mississippi and Tennessee (along with Arkansas, which also has an
interest in the shared Aquifer) engaged in studies and discussions with
the hope of reaching an interstate agreement. Frustrated by the lack of
progress on an agreement, Mississippi again turned to litigation.
In June of 2014, Mississippi returned to the Supreme Court, this time
seeking leave to file a complaint before the Court directly. 4 Mississippi
was undeterred by the Supreme Court's prior rejections of its
sovereignty theory, because this time the state did not even seek
equitable apportionment in the alternative. 65 Instead, Mississippi argued
that it has sovereign ownership of the water being drawn from the
Sparta-Memphis Aquifer. Based on this claim of sovereign ownership,
Mississippi argued that the pumping of groundwater by (and allowed
by) the State of Tennessee, the City of Memphis, and MLGW is
tantamount to conversion. 66 In Mississippi's view, when it was admitted
to the Union in 1817, it "became vested with ownership, control, and
dominion over the land and waters within its territorial boundaries. 67
Mississippi thus contends that Tennessee's pumping of groundwater
that in its natural state would remain in Mississippi violates
Mississippi's "retained sovereign rights under the United States
Constitution" and "constitute[s] ... trespass upon, and conversion,
taking and misappropriation of, [Mississippi's] property. 61
Crucial to Mississippi's arguments is the contention that "[tihis case
does not fall within the Court's equitable apportionment jurisprudence"
because, although "[tihe geologic formation in which the groundwater is
stored straddles two states," the water "is not a shared natural
resource." 69 As relief, Mississippi requests "a declaratory judgment
61 Id. at 14.
62 Id. at 17.
63 Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 130 S. Ct. 1319 (2010).
64 Docket of Case No. 220143, supra note 3.
65 Complaint, supra note 5, at 23 24.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 8.
68 Id. at 52.
69 Id. at 38, 41, 48-49.
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establishing Mississippi's sovereign right, title and exclusive interest in
the groundwater stored naturally in the Sparta Sand formation
underlying Mississippi. 7
0
The U.S. Solicitor General and defendants both initially urged the
court to reject Mississippi's request for leave to file a complaint for a
simple reason: an equitable apportionment is all Mississippi could
possibly be entitled to, and because it hasn't asked for one, it has no
right to be before the court].1 They contended that Mississippi was
recycling the same "territorial property rights" theory that already failed
before the Court in 2010.72 Defendants argued that the Court's
"equitable apportionment decisions have consistently rejected
Mississippi's theory that a State has sovereign ownership and control
over interstate waters flowing within its boundaries.7 3 Instead,
defendants' position is that "'whenever ... the action of one [S]tate
reaches[] through the agency of natural laws[] into the territory of
another [S]tate"', equitable apportionment applies, period. 4 Tennessee
argues that the cone of depression caused by MLGW's pumping is just
such an example of one state's activities reaching into another. 5
Defendants further contend that the doctrine of equitable apportionment
encompasses Mississippi's claims because Mississippi "admits that the
Aquifer is an interconnected hydrological formation and that, in its
natural state, the water in the Aquifer flows, even if slowly, across state
boundaries.7 6 Thus, because Mississippi "has abandoned its equitable
70 Id. at 40, 46. Mississippi also requests damages "in an amount equal to the value of the
Mississippi groundwater" taken by defendants plus prejudgment interest, which Mississippi
estimates would total $615 million. Id. at 55. In the alternative, Mississippi requests an
accounting and disgorgement of "all profits, proceeds, consequential gains, saved expenditures,
and other benefits realized by" defendants. Id. at 56. Finally, Mississippi requests that
defendants "be required to prospectively take all actions necessary to eliminate the cone of
depression vis-A-vis Mississippi," including "the finding, construction and modification or
restructuring of Memphis-MLGW's groundwater pumping systems." Id. at 57.
71 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 13 ("[T]he court should deny
Mississippi leave to file its complaint without prejudice to refiling a properly framed complaint
for an equitable apportionment of the Aquifer premised on concrete allegations of real and
substantial injury.").
72 Brief of Defendant State of Tennessee in Opposition to State of Mississippi's Motion for
Leave to File Bill of Complaint in Original Action at 10, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No. 220143
(U.S. Sept. 5, 2014), 2014 WL 5449619, at *10 [hereinafter Tenn. Br.].
73 Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, supra note 1, at 10.
74 Tenn. Br., supra note 72, at 18 (quoting Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97-98 (1906)
(alterations to quoted source omitted)); see also Brief of Defendant City of Memphis, Tennessee
and Memphis Light, Gas and Water Division in Opposition to the State of Mississippi's Motion
for Leave to File Bill of Complaint in Original Action at 12 14, Mississippi v. Tennessee, No.
220143 (U.S. Sept. 5, 2014), 2014 WL 5463360, at *12 *14 [hereinafter Memphis Br.].
75 Tenn. Br., supra note 72, at 18 19.
76 Tenn. Br., supra note 72, at 18; see also Memphis Br., supra note 74, at 11 12.
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apportionment claim," Tennessee argued that Mississippi "has no
legally cognizable claim for damages arising out of Memphis's and
MLGW's use of the Aquifer. 77
Despite the Court's own prior rejection of the matter and the urging
of the Solicitor General to reject the case, the Supreme Court granted
Mississippi leave to file its bill of complaint on June 29, 2015.78 The
Supreme Court's grant of leave suggests the Court will consider
Mississippi's arguments of absolute ownership of the groundwater
within its borders, or it presumably would have rejected this case like it
did in 2010. 79
The Court appears to have three options. First, it could accept
Mississippi's position that it has a sovereign ownership right over water
in the aquifer and that Tennessee is converting this water regardless of
whether the water has been apportioned."0 Second, it could finally make
clear that groundwater is subject to the equitable apportionment
doctrine. 1 Finally, it could establish a rule for addressing harms from
groundwater use between states out of its interstate nuisance doctrine.
Parts III through VI of this article explain why Mississippi's arguments
of sovereignty are based on a flawed view of the nature of state title to
water, are inconsistent with state groundwater law, and are better
addressed using the other two options before the Court. But before
turning to this extensive legal discussion, more background on the
Sparta-Memphis Aquifer and the science of groundwater pumping will
be useful.
Groundwater is water found beneath the Earth's surface within the
saturated zone of a porous geologic formation.82 The saturated zone is
the area underground where all interconnected openings are full of
water. 3 Directly above the saturated zone is the unsaturated zone the
area beneath the ground where the pores and fractures in the
77 Tenn. Br., supra note 72, at 21. Defendants also have raised the doctrine of res judicata
based on Hood, an issue not within the auspices of this article. See id. at 22 33; Memphis Br.,
supra note 74, at 22 35.
78 See Docket of Case No. 220143, supra note 3.
79 Shortly before this article went to print, Tennessee moved for judgment on the pleadings.
See Motion of Defendant Tennessee for Judgment on the Pleadings, Mississippi v. Tennessee,
No. 220143 (U.S. Feb. 25, 2016). Tennessee raises the same arguments that it raised in opposing
the Bill of Complaint, namely that Mississippi has no property interest in the water located within
the Sands Aquifer, and that equitable apportionment is the only legal doctrine that would afford
Mississippi any enforceable water rights against Tennessee. Id. at 1 3.
80 See Complaint, supra note 5, at 12 21.
81 See Tenn. Br., supra note 72, at 18 19.
82 RALPH C. HEATH, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, WATER-SUPPLY PAPER 2220, BASIC
GROUND-WATER HYDROLOGY 1, 4 (1987); 31 TEx. ADMIN. CODE § 601.3(6) (2006).
83 HEATH, supra note 82, at 4.
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underground materials contain both water and air. 4 The unsaturated
zone is important to groundwater use because water percolating from
the surface of the land through this zone recharges and replenishes all of
the water in the deeper, saturated zone.85
An aquifer is a source of groundwater that contains sufficiently
saturated, permeable material to yield significant quantities of water to
wells.16 Aquifers are either confined or unconfined. 7 A confined aquifer
is completely filled with water and covered by a confining bed a layer
of less permeable material (e.g. shale or clay), which prevents the water
in the aquifer from moving upward."8 Conversely, an unconfined aquifer
lacks an impermeable surface and is partially filled with water. 9
Unconfined aquifers contain a boundary between the unsaturated and
saturated zones known as the water table.9" The water table typically
rises with increased recharge from precipitation and lowers in response
to seasonally dry weather, drought, or excessive pumping of
groundwater.91 "Principal aquifers" are highly productive and nationally
significant, many of which are interstate aquifers.92 According to the
U.S. Geological Survey, there are approximately 66 principal aquifers in
the United States.93
Cities and other water users generally obtain groundwater by digging
or drilling a well into an aquifer and then using a pump to bring the
water to the surface. 94 When wells actively pump groundwater to the
surface, the pumping action lowers the water level around the well base,
forming a cone of depression centered on the well. 95 Active pumping
can create an expanding cone of depression, which in turn can lower the
water level for surrounding properties, interfering with neighboring
wells and sometimes causing those other wells to go dry.96 Competing
wells and the resulting well interference is a common source of
intrastate litigation over groundwater use. When the aquifer extends
beyond state lines and the competing neighbors are in different states,
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Id. at 6.
87 Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at32.
92 Id.
93 Aquifer Basics: Principal Aquifers by Name, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY,
http://water.usgs.gov/ogw/aquiferbasics/alphabetical.html (last visited Mar. 6, 2016).
94 HEATH, supra note 82, at 10.
95 Id. at 30.
96 Id.
2016]
164 Virginia Environmental Law Journal [Vol. 34:152
the intrastate dispute becomes interstate, and something like the
Mississippi-Tennessee litigation could arise.9"
The Sparta-Memphis Aquifer is a distinct geologic formation that lies
within the Middle Claiborne Aquifer, a hydrogeological unit within the
Mississippi embayment aquifer system.98 The groundwater in the
Sparta-Memphis Aquifer, however, does not exist in isolation, but rather
forms part of a hydrologically-interconnected regional watershed.99
Several surface rivers and their corresponding watersheds, including the
Wolf River, play key roles in recharging the Aquifer. l"'
Mississippi's argument that groundwater pumping in Tennessee has
impacted groundwater levels within its borders is factually premised
upon a study completed in 1976 which analyzed the pre-development
hydrology of the Memphis Aquifer1"1 beneath Shelby County.10 2 The
study concluded that historically the water in the aquifer flowed
westward parallel to the Tennessee-Mississippi border, and thus there
was no interstate groundwater flow prior to development.1 3 According
to this study, pumping groundwater in Shelby County caused
groundwater movement to shift and flow across the Tennessee-
Mississippi border from the southeast toward the northwest. 1 4 This is
97 Id. at30 31.
98 Waldron & Larsen, supra note 1, at 135.
99 TONY P. SCHRADER, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS REPORT
2009-5207, WATER LEVELS AND SELECTED WATER-QUALITY CONDITIONS IN THE SPARTA-
MEMPHIS AQUIFER (MIDDLE CLA1BORNE AQUIFER) IN ARKANSAS, SPRING-SUMMER 2007, at 2
(2009).
100 See ORVILLE B. LLOYD, JR. & WILLIAM L. LYKE, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND
WATER ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES, HYDROLOGIC INVESTIGATIONS ATLAS 730-K, SEGMENT
10, ILLINOIS, INDIANA, KENTUCKY, OHIO, TENNESSEE, at K27 (1995); ROBERT A. RENKEN, U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, GROUND WATER ATLAS OF THE UNITED STATES, HYDROLOGIC
INVESTIGATIONS ATLAS 730- F, SEGMENT 5, ARKANSAS, LOUISIANA, MISSISSIPPI, at F 16 (1998).
101 The Memphis Aquifer is an "equivalent" aquifer to the Sparta Aquifer. "Equivalent" is a
classification which describes the similarity between aquifers in terms of time of formation and
deposition. Due to this similarity and their hydrologic connection to each other in the Middle
Claiborne Aquifer, water levels in the Sparta aquifer typically correlate to water levels in the
Memphis Aquifer, and the U.S. Geological Survey considers both one hydrologic unit. See TONY
P. SCHRADER, POTENTIOMETRIC SURFACE IN THE SPARTA-MEMPHIS AQUIFER OF THE
MISSISSIPPI EMBAYMENT, SPRING 2007, SCIENTIFIC INVESTIGATIONS MAP 3014, at 1 (2008).
This connection is why the aquifer is referred to collectively as the "Sparta-Memphis Aquifer."
The 1976 study considered the Memphis Aquifer. However, because the Memphis Aquifer is both
equivalent to the Sparta Aquifer and essentially one hydrologic unit, the conclusions are
indicative of the pre-development conditions of the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer as a whole. See
Waldron & Larsen, supra note 1, at 133, 135.
102 Waldron & Larsen, supra note 1, at 135, 151; see also CRINER & PARKS supra note 28, at
5 7.
103 CRINER & PARKS, supra note 28, at 22.
104 Id.
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the factual basis for Mississippi's argument that Tennessee has taken
(i.e. converted) Mississippi's groundwater.
However, a more recent study concluded that this previous study's
conclusions may not be based upon reliable data.105 To determine the
pre-development hydrologic conditions of the Memphis Aquifer, the
1976 study was based upon five locations in Shelby County,
Tennessee.10 6 The study's authors alleged these locations represented
pre-development conditions of the Memphis Aquifer. 10 7 When the study
was conducted, however, the time span between pre and post
development ranged from forty-one to seventy-four years. 10 '
The more recent study conducted a new analysis on the pre-
development conditions in the Memphis Aquifer by analyzing historical
well data, in addition to data from Mississippi. 109 The study relied upon
early records of groundwater wells that included information about well
depth, depth to groundwater, pump rate, and water quality.110 R.C.
Graves famously drilled the first well in the Memphis Aquifer in
downtown Memphis in 1886, which marks the beginning of the
aquifer's development.11 This study was based upon historical records
starting only eight years after development began.112 These historical
records produce a more accurate picture of pre-development
groundwater conditions because of the smaller gap of time between pre-
and post-development. In addition, including wells in Mississippi
(ignored in the 1976 study) provides a more complete picture of the
interstate flow in the Memphis Aquifer.
This recent study used these historical records to analyze and
extrapolate data sets to understand pre-development groundwater
conditions by using complex, hydrologic computer models. The authors
concluded that unlike the authors of the 1976 study originally thought,
groundwater gradients along the Tennessee-Mississippi border did not
flow westward.113 Instead, the authors of the recent study discovered in
pre-development conditions the groundwater would flow northwest
across the Tennessee-Mississippi border at a rate of over 58 million
gallons (220,000 in3 ) per day, invalidating the claim that development
105 Waldron & Larsen, supra note 1, at 133, 151.
106 Id.; CRINER & PARKS, supra note 28, at 1 5.
107 Waldron & Larsen, supra note 1, at 135, 151.
108 Id. at 138.
109 Id. at 133, 151.
110 Id. at 138.
II Id. at 134.
112 Id. at 151.
113 Id.
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has caused this flow gradient.1 14 In the scientific opinions of the study
authors, these results, "raise concern in the State of Mississippi's claim
that MLGW altered a zero-gradient flow condition along the Shelby
County to now unrightfully pull groundwater across the county line due
to excessive pumping in Shelby County."'1 15 Instead, the study actually
indicates that flow into Memphis, rather than Mississippi, has been
reduced due to development.1 16 The study concluded that the flow into
Memphis has been reduced by about 10.5 million gallons (40,000 in3 )
per day. 117
These findings demonstrate the factual and technical misconceptions
that Mississippi's arguments are premised upon, before even
considering the fundamental problems with the State's legal arguments.
The Memphis Aquifer is not, despite its descriptive name, isolated or
geographically bound by state and political borders. Rather, the regional
aquifer, by any name, is a continuous interstate resource containing
groundwater that flows across state lines, both pre- and post-
development. There is no hydrologic separation along state lines.
Further, the assertion that the groundwater pumped in Shelby County,
Tennessee has been unnaturally diverted from its natural place in
Mississippi is not supported by technical studies. Groundwater has
always flowed across state borders, and increased pumping in
Tennessee has resulted primarily in less groundwater flowing to
Memphis, not more. Water is simply not divisible and static like other
forms of property. The law has always recognized this reality, as the
following sections explain in greater detail.
III. THE CHARACTER OF STATE TITLE TO WATERS
In Mississippi's view it is "vested with ownership... over the land
and waters within its territorial boundaries." '118 It contends that if another
state begins pumping groundwater and this pumping drains some
water in Mississippi this other state has unlawfully taken its
property.1 19 The argument is that the other state has converted
Mississippi's property, violating Mississippi's ownership rights. To
support this unprecedented conversion theory, Mississippi cites to cases
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 Michael Campana, Ddj Vu All Over Again: Mississippi v. Memphis Over Groundwater
Pumping, AM. WATER RES. ASS'N WATER RESOURCES BLOG (Oct. 14, 2014),
http://awramedia.org/mainblog/2014/10/14/deja-vu-all-over-again-mississippi-v-memphis-over-
groundwater-pumping/.
117 Id.
118 Complaint, supra note 5, at 8 10, 42-45.
119 Id. at 14 (accusing defendant of committing "conversion" and "trespass").
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such as Kansas v. Colorado for the proposition that a state holds actual
title to the waters within its borders.12
It is true that states own things. They own plots of land, for example,
and they own the structures they build on these lands. But whether
states, as sovereigns, can own water and other wild resources is a
different question. Do states own the rabbits that burrow in a state forest
for a time? Birds that fly over while migrating south? More important
for our purposes, do they own the fish that swim up their streams, or the
waters that flow under or over land within the state on a given day?
These types of wild resources, also referred to as ferae resources,121
don't fit neatly under the "property" rubric:122
Water rights do not, as a species of property, fall within our
normal sense and everyday understanding about property in land
and chattels. The reason is obvious, and it inheres in the very
nature of water as it exists in nature. Unlike land and structures,
water in natural watercourses is neither static nor well-defined.
It moves and it changes. 'One cannot step into the same stream
twice' is the famous maxim from antiquity, and it succinctly
conveys the central problem for recognizing property in running
water. 'Running water at one instance is at one place in the
river, then it is gone and some other water has succeeded it,
without anyone having been able to tag it as his own; a thing in
continual motion and ceaseless change, incapable of possession
or ownership in that condition.123
Civilizations have been wrestling with the question of sovereign
ownership of ferae resources since at least the Roman Code of
Justinian. 124 Justinian's Code put sovereign property relationships into
120 See Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907). As explained further infra, nothing in Kansas
militates toward the conclusion that states have a bona fide property interest in water within their
borders.
121 Westmoreland & Cambria Nat. Gas. Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725 (Pa. 1889).
122 See, e.g., id.
123 David B. Anderson, Water Rights As Property in Tulare v. United States, 38 McGEORGE
L. REv. 461, 473 74 (2007) (citations omitted). As we will explore further in later sections, the
concept that water cannot be "owned" as property, and does not properly fit into the property
rubric, has been espoused for centuries. See, e.g., SAMUEL C. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE
WESTERN STATES 10- 13 (3d ed. 1911). This section, however, focuses on sovereign ownership of
water, distinct from the question whether water can be owned by anyone.
124 See, e.g., Gail Osherenko, New Discourses on Ocean Governance: Understanding
Property Rights and the Public Trust, 21 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 317, 350 (2006). The Justinian
Code is worth considering given that legal authorities have often cited it as the basis of U.S. water
allocation jurisprudence. See Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987) ("The principle
that the public has an overriding interest in navigable waterways and lands under them is at least
as old as the Code of Justinian .... (citations omitted)); State v. Central Vermont Ry., Inc., 571
A.2d 1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989) ("The public trust doctrine is an ancient one, having its roots in the
Justinian Institutes of Roman law."(citations omitted)); National Audubon Society v. Superior
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two categories: sovereign dominium and sovereign imperium.125
Imperium is an exercise of sovereign authority over something it may
sometimes look like property, but in reality, it is just the government's
ability to regulate something. 126 Dominium is a tangible property
right.127 Courts and scholars have often pointed to Justinian's Code for
the proposition that water cannot be "owned"-or in other words, that
sovereigns can only have a relationship of imperium with water by
citing the phrase "all of these things are by natural law common to all:
air, flowing water, the sea and, consequently, the shores of the sea." '128
Court of Alpine Cnty. (Mono Lake), 658 P.2d 709, 718 (Cal. 1983); Montana Coal. for Stream
Access v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163, 167 (Mont. 1984) ("The theory underlying this doctrine can be
traced from Roman Law through Magna Carta to present day decisions."); Cynthia L. Koehler,
Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the Mono Lake Controversy, 1995
ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 544 45 (1995); Michael Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono Lake and the
Evolving Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 713 (1995) ("The trust doctrine's
common law origins can, in fact, be traced back to medieval England and ultimately to Roman
law. Consequently, there are sound historical and conceptual reasons for grounding the public
trust in common law."(footnote omitted)).
125 Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicum, and the Public Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA
GRANT L. J. 13 (1976); Darcy Alan Frownfelter, The International Component of Texas Water
Law, 18 ST. MARY'S L.J. 481, 492 n.65 (1986) ("Imperium is governmental power to regulate.").
126 See sources cited supra note 124; see also Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 402 n.37
(1948).
127 Deveney, supra note 125, at 13 ("While on land, governments have both imperium and
dominium, the law is quite different with regard to the seas. Both scholarly and lay literatures
frequently fail to distinguish between imperium and dominium, thus eroding the distinction
between the exercise of authority and the entitlements of ownership.").
128 Anderson, supra note 123, at 475 ("Roman law did not distinguish among the many forms
of fresh water in nature: clouds, rain, diffused surface water, stream flow, river underflow,
percolating groundwater, vapor, lakes, flood water, seepage, etc. Because of the fugitive and
fluctuating character of water in its natural state, Roman law denied the existence of property in
water altogether including running water and held the use of rivers and lakes to be the
common right of everyone, like the sea and the air."). Roman law also distinguished between
things which are "res nullius, the property of no one, along with the air, the sea, and wild animals,
or as res communes, common things owned by everyone." Frank J. Trelease, Government
Ownership of Water, 45 CAL. L. REv. 638, 640 (1957). More modem scholars often refer to this
concept of not recognizing property interests in water and other natural resources as a "negative
community of interest." See ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, TRAITE DU DROIT DE PROPRIETE, Nos.
27 28 (Chez Debure ed. 1772) ("The first of mankind had in common all those things which God
had given to the human race. This community was not a positive community of interest, like that
which exists between several persons who have ownership of a thing in which each have their
particular portion. It was a... 'negative community,' which resulted from the fact that those
things which were common to all belonged no more to one that to the others ... That which fell
to each one among them commenced to belong to him in private ownership, and this process is
the origin of the right of property. Some things, however, did not enter into this division, and
remain, therefore, to this day, in the condition of the ancient and negative community .... These
things are those which the juris consults called 'res communes' -the air, the water which runs in
the rivers, the sea, and its shores."); Geer v. Connecticut., 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896), overruled by
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (discussing water ownership in terms of a "negative
community of interest").
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But it appears that this was merely an aspirational goal, and that
Roman law (like, English law, as discussed below) allowed a sovereign
to hold title to water as a practical matter.129 In other words, despite how
both Roman and English law were outwardly skeptical of allowing
sovereigns to own water, they nevertheless appear to have allowed it.
Several commentators have posited that the statements from the
Justinian Code suggesting water belonged to the public, and not to the
sovereign, were "more aspiration than description,""13 and that the
Roman government frequently treated water as private, titled property
even granting it to individuals.131
Roman law may have been clear on this point, but the question here
is whether U.S. states own water. For answers, it is helpful to review
some historic legal concepts closer to the contemporary American
system than Roman law-namely, English common law. It is helpful to
review the course, up to the present day, by which the United States
adopted English common law principles of sovereign water ownership
jurisprudence. What emerges is a muddled jurisprudential path, but one
that ends in a clear conclusion: states don't own water, and they
probably never did.
Early England, as a practical matter, tended to view virtually all
resources, including water, as the crown's property and only the
crown's property.132 Lord Hale, a notable authority on early English
common law, explained that the king was the only entity capable of
owning water:
[A] subject hath not nor indeed cannot have that property in the
sea, through a whole tract of it, as the king hath; because
without a regular power he cannot possibly possess it ... [t]he
right of property in the tide waters of England is, moreover,
129 Deveney, supra note 125, at 29, 32 33 ("In actuality, the sea and the seashore were
common to all only insofar as they were not yet appropriated to the use of anyone or allocated by
the state ... there were no restraints whatever imposed by law on the power of the sovereign to
convey public lands, including the sea and seashore ... [but] Roman law did contain a
presumption that grants made by the state which operated to the detriment of the general public in
their use of public ways ... were to be strictly construed by the courts to avoid such detriment as
far as possible."); STUART A. MOORE, A HISTORY OF THE FORESHORE 31 33 (3d ed. 1888).
130 See James R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and
Public Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1, 8 9 (1997) ("More detailed historical
work on Roman law, however, has suggested that this statement from The Institutes was more
aspiration than description."); ROSCOE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
197 202 (1922)); Erin Ryan, Public Trust and Distrust: The Theoretical Implications of the
Public Trust Doctrine for Natural Resource Management, 31 ENVTL. L. 477, 481 (2001) (noting
that it "remains unclear whether [the Code's reference to water being free to all] represented true
Roman practice or mere Justinian aspiration").
131 See Trelease, supra note 128, at 640.
132 See LORD HALE, DE JURE MARIS, chs. 4, 6 (emphasis in original).
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vested in the king, not merely on the principle, that he is the
universal occupant, but on the principle of his being the fountain
from whence, in contemplation of law, all authority and
privilege proceed .... [T]he sea is not only under the dominion
of the king.., but it is also his proper inheritance.133
In other words, the Crown inherited dominion over all resources the
Crown then decided whether to dole out anything to the public. 13 4 This
shows that many English authorities still embraced the theory that the
Crown owned English water at least into the late 1800s. 135 Moore
explained that the Crown had titled away many water beds and the
water above them.136
But the early English theory that anyone could "own" water, Crown
or not, was not without critics. 13 7 For example, Lord Hailsham's famous
summary of English law explained that "[a]lthough certain rights as
regards flowing water are incident to the ownership of riparian property,
the water itself, whether flowing in a known and defined channel or
percolating through the soil, is not, at common law, the subject of
property or capable of being granted to anybody.""13 As early as the start
of the nineteenth century, an increasing number of English authorities
began shifting to the tenets scholars had heralded for centuries: water
can't be owned. In 1823, in Wright v. Howard, the High Court of
Chancery explicitly stated that "there is no property in the water." '139 The
next year, in Williams v. Moreland, it held that "[fllowing water is
originally publici juris," and "running water is not in its nature...
property."g1 4 'A few years later, in Liggins v. Inge, it reiterated that
"[w]ater flowing in a stream... is publici juris," or in other words, free
to all. 1
41
In Mason v. Hill in 1833, Lord Denman noted that "[n]o one ha[s]
any property in the water itself," and explained that England had
adopted into the common law this principle that the corpus of water was
133 See id.
134 See HENRICUS DE BRACTONA, DE LEGIBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE, 2 ON THE
LAW AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 42 (1968) [hereinafter Bracton].
135 MOORE, supra note 129, at 809.
136 Id. at 121 140.
137 See, e.g., Bracton, supra note 134, at 39; POTHIER, supra note 128, at nos. 27 28.
138 LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLEBONE, 49(2) HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND 62 (4th
ed. 2004) (emphasis added).
139 SIR JOHN LEACH, REPORTS OF CASES DECIDED IN THE HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY 203
(1843).
140 WIEL, supra note 123, at § 3-7.
141 Id.
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not the subject of ownership.142 Following this, many English cases
continued to conceive of water as incapable of being owned.143
But despite this criticism of the water ownership theory, English law
seems to have applied title theories to water, at least from the
perspective of the Crown.144 The Crown was presumed to own English
waters.145 And that ownership could even be divested to private parties
in certain circumstances. 14 6 Early English common law embraced the
ideal that water could not be owned scholars touted it, and cases cited
aspirational language disavowing ownership of water.14 But from a
practical matter, the English Crown continued to view its relationship
with water as one of title, or at least presumptive title.
After the American Revolution and throughout the early and mid-
nineteenth century, the United States adopted the English model of
sovereign control of water, but with a democratic twist.14 Early U.S.
jurisprudence reasoned that the federal government inherited waterbeds
and water, and then transferred title to each state as it entered the
union.149 The twist was that, because the "people" are sovereign in
America, the states held title to water and other wild resources on behalf
142 Id.
143 McCarter v. Hudson Cnty.Water Co., 70 N.J. Eq. 525 (1905); Embrey v. Owen, (1851) 155
Eng. Rep. 579, 579; 6 Exch. 353, 353 ("Flowing water is publici juris, not in the sense that it is
bonum vacans, to which the first occupant may acquire an exclusive right, but that it is public and
common in this sense only: that all may reasonably use it who have a right of access to it; that
none can have any property in the water itself, except in the particular portion which he may
choose to abstract from the stream and take into his possession, and that during the time of
possession only."); Race v. Ward, (1855) 119 Eng. Rep. 259, 259, 4 E. & B. 702, 702; Manning
v. Wasdale, (1836) 111 Eng. Rep. 1353, 1353, 5 Ad. & E. 758, 758; see also Challenor v.
Thomas, (1608) 80 Eng. Rep. 96, 96.
144 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, LAWS OF ENGLAND ch. 8, 298-9; HARG. LAW
TRACTS, DE JURE MARIS, ch. 4, 10, 11, 12; 6 Com. Dig. tit. Prerogative, 60, B. 63; Tenure 337; 5
Com. Dig. tit. Navigation, 107; 3 Co. 5, 109. 2.
145 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 344 (1828); see also Rasband, supra note
130, at 8 9.
146 Rasband, supra note 130, at 8 9.
147 See supra notes 136 43.
148 Stockton v. Balt. & N.Y. R.R. Co., 32 F. 9, 19 21 (C.C.D.N.J. 1887).
149 Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842). The tide-based navigation distinction
was the initial rule in the colonies, but later courts shifted to conclude that states holds
presumptive title to navigable waters even if they are not subject to the tide. See, e.g., Elder v.
Burrus, 25 Tenn. (1 Hum.) 358, 365 67 (1845); Bullock v. Wilson, 2 Port. 436, 444 45 (Ala.
1835); Wilson v. Forbes, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 30, 30 (1828); Cates' Ex'rs v. Wadlington, 12 S.C.L.
(1 McCord) 580, 580 (1822); Carson v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475, 475 (Pa. 1810). By the late
nineteenth century, "the now prevailing doctrine" was that states controlled "title in the soil of
rivers really navigable." Shively v. Bowlby 152 U.S. 1, 31 (1894). See generally Robin Kundis
Craig, Adapting to Climate Change: The Potential Role of State Common-Law Public Trust
Doctrines, 34 VT. L. REV. 781, 801-02 (2010).
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of their collective citizens (not on behalf of the Crown as a sovereign
entity). 150
The U.S. Supreme Court began to delve deeply into the state-water
relationship in 1842.151 In Martin v. Lessee of Waddell, the Court held
that the 13 original States, on behalf of the citizens of each, "hold the
absolute right to all their navigable waters and the soils under them. 15
2
Throughout the nineteenth century, the Court held that this same
principle applied to every state as it entered the union, vesting each with
absolute "rights" to navigable water within their borders, as co-equal
sovereigns. 153 This concept is referred to now as the "equal footing
doctrine. '154  The equal footing doctrine stands for the simple
proposition that as each state entered the union, it took control of
waterbeds and water within its borders as a matter of constitutional law
(not Congressional vestment). 155 The states thus have power to allocate
and govern these waterbeds, and the water above, subject only to "the
paramount power of the United States to control such waters for
purposes of navigation in interstate and foreign commerce. '"156
150 See Proprietors of Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420
(1837) 36 U.S. 420 (Pet.) 36 U.S. (1 Wall.) 420, **169 (1837) (opinion of Baldwin, J.)
(explaining that "[b]y the common law, it is clear, that all arms of the sea, coves, creeks, etc.
where the tide ebbs and flows, are the property of the sovereign... 'the principles of the common
law were well understood by the colonial legislature," but that this title is held on behalf of U.S.
citizens); 9. Stockton, 32 F. at 19. ("The information rightly states that prior to the Revolution the
shore and lands under water of the navigable streams and waters of the province of New Jersey
belonged to the king of Great Britain, as part of the jura regalia of the crown, and devolved to the
state by right of conquest. The information does not state, however, what is equally true, that after
the conquest the said lands were held by the state, as they were by the king, in trust for the public
uses of navigation and fishery, and the erection thereon of wharves, piers, light-houses, beacons,
and other facilities of navigation and commerce.").
151 This is not to say that prior cases had not addressed sovereign water ownership, they had.
See, e.g., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71 (1821). But this was the first time the U.S. Supreme
Court weighed in on state ownership in a meaningful way.
152 Martin, 41 U.S. at 410.
153 See, e.g., Oregon v. Corvallis Sand & Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363, 374 (1977); United States
v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950); Knight v. U.S. Land Ass'n, 142 U.S. 161, 183, (1891);
Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 216 (1845); see also PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana,
132 S. Ct. 1215, 1219 (2012).
154 See PPL Montana, LLC, 132 S. Ct. at 1219.
155 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi,484 U.S. 469, 486 (1988); see also Shively v.
Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 49 (1894) ("And the territories acquired by congress, whether by deed of
cession from the original states, or by treaty with a foreign country, are held with the object, as
soon as their population and condition justify it, of being admitted into the Union as states, upon
an equal footing with the original states in all respects; and the title and dominion of the tide
waters ... are held by the United States ... in trust for the future states."); Pollard 44 U.S. at 216.
156 See United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 14 (1935); see also Montana v. United States, 450
U.S. 544, 551, 101 S.Ct. 1245, 67 L.Ed.2d 493 (1981); United States v. Holt State Bank, 270 U.S.
49, 54 (1926); Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 285 (1997).
2016] Interstate Groundwater Law Revisited
But what does saying states have the "right" to water, and "control"
over water, mean? Many cases before and near the turn of the
nineteenth century used language indicating that states had actual title in
water, not just power to regulate them. For example, in Donnelly v.
United States, the Court said "that the title of the navigable waters, and
the soil beneath them, was in the state, and subject to its sovereignty and
jurisdiction.""15 But then came the high-water mark for state ownership
of wild resources like water.15 Although not technically about water
ownership per se, towards the end of the nineteenth century a trio of
cases addressed ownership of water creatures and water beds (resources
generally lumped together with disposition of the water itself).159 These
cases have been the primary ammunition for proponents of state water
title theories. 16' Before these cases, there had been little reason for the
Court to decide whether states "owned" water, or what state ownership
of water would mean in practice. 161 But here, states raised their
ownership over ferae resources as a shield against federal doctrines,
namely the dormant commerce clause and the privileges and immunity
clause. 161 So the Court was forced to tangle deeply with the state
ownership question. 163
157 228 U.S. 243, 260 (1913) (emphasis added). Notably, state cases around the nation had
already weighed in and often found sovereign ownership of water suspect. See, e.g., Arnold v.
Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821) ("The sovereign power itself, therefore, cannot, consistently with
the principles of the law of nature and the constitution of a well-ordered society, make a direct
and absolute grant of the waters of the state, divesting all the citizens of their common right. It
would be a grievance which never could be long borne by a free people.").
158 Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230) , is considered the
foundation of these cases.
159 See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 525 (1896) (discussing the nature of "the air, the
water which runs in the rivers, the sea, and its shores ... [and] wild animals" all having been
relegated to the "negative community"); see also Utah Div. of State Lands v. United States, 482
U.S. 193, 195 (1987) (discussing "ownership of submerged lands which carries with it the
power to control navigation, fishing, and other public uses of water"); Gypsum Res., LLC v.
Masto, 672 F. Supp. 2d 1127, 1139 (D. Nev. 2009) (discussing the disposition of feraue resources
such as "nature of the air, water, and wildlife resources"); Washington Kelpers Ass'n v. State,
502 P.2d 1170, 1172 (Wash. 1972); Dale D. Goble, Three Cases /Four Tales: Commons,
Capture, the Public Trust, and Property in Land, 35 ENVTL. L. 807, 828 (2005) ("The king's
prerogative ownership of royal fishes, in other words, was part of his ownership of navigable
waters because the greater includes the lesser."); James L. Huffman, Speaking of Inconvenient
Truths-A History of the Public Trust Doctrine, 18 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 1, 82 (2007).
160 See Goble, supra note 159, at 833 34.
161 Id.
162 See, e.g., Corfield, 6 F. Cas. at 552 (analyzing privileges and immunity clause conflict with
state ownership of wildlife).
163 Prior cases sometimes referred to state ownership of water, but there was little reason for
the Court to figure out what sovereign ownership would mean on the ground. See, e.g., Martin v.
Lessee of Waddell, 41 U.S. 367 (1842) (not addressing whether states actually owned or could
convert each other's water).
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The facts of these cases are similar: a state wanted to allow its own
citizens to have certain privileges over natural resources within their
borders, while at the same time withholding these same privileges from
citizens of other states. 164 The outsiders responded by citing the
privileges and immunity or dormant commerce clause, arguing that a
state could not discriminate or burden interstate commerce in this
way. 165 The states arguing for control of the water riposted: we own
these wild resources, and we can allocate our property to our citizens as
we see fit.166
In 1825, in Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Washington explained that
New Jersey could prevent citizens of other states from harvesting oyster
beds within New Jersey. 167 The Court reasoned that New Jersey owned
these beds, and that "in regulating the use of the common property of the
citizens of [a] state, the legislature is [not] bound to extend to the
citizens of all the other states the same advantages as are secured to
their own citizens. 16 8
This set the stage for McCready v. Virginia, roughly thirty years
later.169 McCready took place during the infamous "oyster wars. 170
State oyster-bed protection laws were passed beginning in the 1700s,
but rampant abuse of these beds, coinciding with the boom of commerce
in certain regions, led Virginia to pass a statute that prohibited citizens
of other states, but not Virginia citizens, from planting oysters in the
waters of Virginia's Ware River.17 1 The Court held that Virginia, on
behalf of its citizens, held "a property right, and not a mere privilege or
immunity of citizenship" in the beds.172 The Court explained that "we
think we may safely hold that the citizens of one State are not invested
by this clause of the Constitution with any interest in the common
property of the citizens of another State. 173 In other words, because it
"owned" the water beds, Virginia could dole out its natural resources as
it saw fit.
174
164 For example, in Corfield, the state wanted to restrict oyster beds to state citizens. 6 F. Cas.
at 552.
165 See id.
166 See id.
167 Id. at 551 2.
168 Id. at 552 (emphasis added).
169 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
170 See generally Osherenko, supra note 124, at 344; BONNIE J. MCCAY, OYSTER WARS AND
THE PUBLIC TRUST (1998); Huffman, supra note 159, at 103.
171 See sources cited supra note 170.
172 McCready, 94 U.S. at 394.
173 Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
174 Id. Obviously this case addressed oysters, not water itself. But as explained supra, courts
have typically treated ownership over the bounties of water along with the water itself There is
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About twenty years later, in Geer, Connecticut tried to control who
could take game birds living within its boundaries, and a challenge was
brought under the commerce clause.175 The Court expressly rejected the
contention "that a State cannot allow its own people the enjoyment of
the benefits of the property belonging to them in common, without at the
same time permitting the citizens of other States to participate in that
which they do not own.117 6 The Court left little doubt that it believed the
state (on behalf of its citizens) owned the wild game within its borders,
and that this ownership was powerful enough to defeat commerce clause
concerns: "The sole consequence of the provision forbidding the
transportation of game killed within the state, beyond the state, is to
confine the use of such game to those who own it the people of that
state." '177
Finally, a decade after Geer, the Court addressed similar issues, this
time directly in the context of water, in Hudson County Water Co. v.
McCarter.17 There, the Court upheld a New Jersey statute prohibiting
the transfer of waters out of state.179 The Court reasoned that "the
constitutional power of the state to insist that its natural advantages shall
remain unimpaired by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice
estimate of the extent of present use or speculation as to future
needs.""1 0
Some language in Hudson explicitly couched state water interest as
"property.""1 1 And the Court relied heavily on Geer, which the Court
would explain many years later (when it overturned this case) "was
premised on the theory that the state owned its wild animals and
therefore was free to qualify any ownership interest it might recognize
in the persons who capture them." '182 Indeed, the court's description of
state interest in water seems to be nearly absolute:
little reason to think the court, at least at this time, would have treated water any differently than
it treated the use of that water and the beds to harvest oysters.
175 Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 520 21 (1896) (emphasis added). Again, this case
concerned wild game, not water. But again, courts have largely treated ferae resources the same,
under theories of public interest and negative community.
176 Id. at 530 (emphasis added).
177 Id. at 529 (emphasis added). Notably, Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that the ownership
theory could not allow the state to interfere with interstate commerce. Id. at 542 44 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
178 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
179 Id. at 356.
180 Id. at 356 57.
181 Id. at 356 (discussing state interest in water, and stating "[w]hat it may protect by suit in
this court from interference in the name of property outside of the state's jurisdiction, one would
think that it could protect by statute from interference in the same name within').
182 Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 950 (1982).
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We are of opinion, further, that the constitutional power of the
state to insist that its natural advantages shall remain unimpaired
by its citizens is not dependent upon any nice estimate of the
extent of present use or speculation as to future needs. The legal
conception of the necessary is apt to be confined to somewhat
rudimentary wants, and there are benefits from a great river that
might escape a lawyer's view. But the state is not required to
submit even to an aesthetic analysis. Any analysis may be
inadequate. It finds itself in possession of what all admit to be a
great public good, and what it has it may keep and give no one a
reason for its will.183
But, it is worth looking closely at the language the Court used here.
Although deferential to the state, the Court spoke about water in Hudson
very differently than it had spoken of other wild resources in McCready,
Geer, and Corfield. The Court's hesitance to attach the "property" label
to water, even in this time of extreme deference to state ownership
interests, is palpable. The Court does not say that states "have title" to
water-as it had when talking about oysters in Corfield and
McCready.184 Nor did the Court say that states "owned" water, as it had
when talking about wild birds in Geer. Instead, the Court was careful to
base its decision in Hudson on a "principle of public interest and the
police power, and not merely as the inheritor of a royal prerogative.'" 185
The Court repeatedly described state interest as one of "protecting
natural resources," not protecting state title: "the state, as quasi-
sovereign and representative of the interests of the public, has a standing
in court to protect the atmosphere, the water, and the forests within its
territory. "186
Crucially, little thought was paid in these early cases as to whether
states, or the federal government, could truly own water as property qua
property. The equal footing doctrine simply passed control of water, to
the extent the federal government had any, to the states.187 These early
cases seemed to tread around the issue of explaining the precise nature
of the sovereign-water relationship in America.188 Were we going to
follow the aspirational principles dating back to the Justinian Code, and
repeated many times since, that water and other wild resources are
183 Hudson, 209 U.S. at 356 57.
184 See Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1825) (No. 3,230); McCready v.
Virginia, 94 U.S. 391, 394 95 (1877).
185 Hudson, 209 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added).
186 Id. at 355 (emphasis added).
187 See supra notes 152 54.
188 See, e.g., Hudson, 209 U.S. at 349.
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something special and not reducible to the property rubric?189 Or would
it adopt the English system, which seemed to treat water as any other
piece of chattel?19
Which path the Court chose at this point at least is not clear.
Although the Court often used "property" and "ownership" labels
during the 1800s, these early cases do not offer finite answers. For
example, in the foundational equal footing doctrine case, the Supreme
Court explained that the federal government held all water "for the
benefit of the whole people," while also stating that it held water "in
trust for the future states." 191 Neither a trust theory, nor a theory where
the U.S. holds water for the benefit of all people, militate towards a
view of sovereign ownership over water.
In another case even before the turn of the nineteenth century, the
Court heavily cabined any theory of state "ownership" of water.192 In
Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, the Court explained that ownership of
water beds is vested in the states, but then clarified that the state's
"consequent right to use or dispose of any portion thereof' was
restricted in critical ways.193 The state's right to dispose of water was
restricted if there was "substantial impairment of the interest of the
public in the waters." '194 Justice Field explained this distinction at length:
That the state holds the title to the lands under the navigable
waters of Lake Michigan, within its limits, in the same manner
that the state holds title to soils under tide water, by the common
law, we have already shown; and that title necessarily carries
with it control over the waters above them, whenever the lands
are subjected to use. But it is a title different in character from
that which the state holds in lands intended for sale. It is
different from the title which the United States hold in the
public lands which are open to pre-emption and sale. It is a title
held in trust for the people of the state, that they may enjoy the
navigation of the waters, carry on commerce over them, and
have liberty of fishing therein, freed from the obstruction or
interference of private parties.195
This key language clarifies that, at a minimum, states didn't own
water like they owned other things; this case would later come to
189 Seesupra notes 123 31.
190 See supra notes 132 50.
191 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 30, 49 (1894).
192 Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435 (1892).
193 Id. This case provides the foundation for the modern doctrine of public trust.
194 Id. (emphasis added).
195 Id. at 452 (emphasis added).
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establish the public trust doctrine.196 The fact is that cases in the
nineteenth century such as McCready and Geer had no problem saying
that a state held title to wild game or oysters. Yet, during this same
period, the Court crafted large exceptions to any theory that a state owns
water. The Court is distinguishing between sovereign "title" in the
waterbed, and then severely cabining any "ownership" right in the
water. 197 At the least, this indicates that even as early as the 1800s, the
Court saw ownership of "land" and "water" as fundamentally distinct,
and to the extent the Court entertained ownership theories in cases like
McCready, they are distinguishable on this basis.19
Even the four cases above, in which the Court seemed to give shrift
to state "ownership" of wild resources, were far from the end of the
state ownership question. One important point is that during this same
time period, the Supreme Court never used property concepts in
deciding water disputes between states.199 Where states have fought over
the corpus of water, as opposed to fights over title to fish or water beds,
the Court has used the apportionment doctrine. 00 For example, in
United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., the Court applied
federalism principles to trounce state interests in water in a river, and
there was no consideration of the state's ownership interest. 01 The only
case where water was at issue and some property-like language was
used, Hudson, carefully framed its language in terms of police powers
and public interest, not property concepts. 22
Interestingly, during the twentieth century, states themselves weighed
in internally on the water ownership issue: they passed water related
statutes and inserted water related language in their constitutions.0 3 The
states were vague and contradictory in describing their relationship to
water. Some declared that water in their borders were the state's
property. 4 Some said that their water was owned by their citizens.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id; see also Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 265 (1891) (declining to
recognize state ownership theory).
199 See e.g., supra note 163.
200 See, e.g., Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Hinderlider v. La Plata River &
Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922);
Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
201 United States v. Rio Grande Dam & Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690, 693 (1899).
202 See Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
203 This movement was part of the cultural push at the time to shift control of the public
domain to states. See infra notes 207 9 and accompanying text.
204 WYO. CONST. art. VIII, § 1; IDAHO CODE ANNO. § 42-101 (1948); N.D. CONST. art. XI, §
3; TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 7467 (1948); CAL. WATER CODE § 102 (1943).
205 ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 45-101 (1956); COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5 ("The water of every
natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be
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Some, such as Kansas, said that the water in their borders were not
owned, but instead "dedicated" to the use of everyone. 6
Complicating the water ownership issue during this time is that it
came as part of a bigger cultural movement which urged the U.S.
government to cede ownership of the entire public domain to the
states."' As explained by Abbott Goldberg:
John C. Calhoun advocated such cession [of the federal
government's rights over the public domain] long before the
Civil War; Wyoming and Colorado advocated it at the
beginning of the conservation movement early in [the twentieth
century] century; and President Hoover and Secretary of the
Interior Wilbur advocated it as late as 1929 in what has been
described as "a striking defense of the doctrine of states'
rights. 2o8
Thus, it may be that the Court during this period sometimes couched its
language in terms of state "ownership" as part of a national discourse on
this issue, while at the same time practically recognizing that giving
states actual ownership over water would be problematic. 209
Although the Court in some early cases used language about state
"ownership," practically, it was not treating state interest in wild
resources as a property right.21° As Trelease explains eloquently in his
treatise, nothing the Court did during this early period required it to
recognize a true ownership interest over water in any state; everything
the Court did could better be characterized, as a practical matter, in
terms of police power principles and principles of state interest in local
affairs, similar to what was happening in the commerce clause
jurisprudence at the time.211 Considering the movement for state
the property of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people of the state, subject
to appropriation as hereinafter provided."); Neb. Rev. Stat. 46-202 (1952); NEV. COMP. LAWS §
7890 (1929); N.M. CONST. art. XVI, § 2; S.D. CODE § 61.0101 (1939); ORE. REV. STAT. §
537.110 (1953); UTAH CODE § 73-1-1 (1953); WASH. REV. CODE §90.04.020 (1951).
206 19 KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 82a-702 (1949); 2 NEB. CONST. art. XV, § 6; NEB. REV.
STAT. § 46-202 (1952); see also Wrathall v. Johnson, 40 P.2d 755, 777 (Utah 1935) ("The
statutory declaration that 'the water of all streams and other sources in this State ... is hereby
declared to be the property of the public' does not vest in the state title to ownership of the water
as a proprietor.").
207 See B. Abbott Goldberg, Interposition- Wild West Water Style, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1964).
208 Id. at 10.
209 Notably, this time in history is also marked by many famous commerce clause cases in
favor of state power over local interests.
210 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92 (1938); Wyoming v.
Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
211 Trelease, supra note 128, at 644 ("As for interstate rights, the United States Supreme Court
has on numerous occasions apportioned the waters of interstate rivers among states without
reference to state stream ownership, using instead concepts of sovereignty or parens patriae.").
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ownership of the public domain, and the push for commerce clause
restrictions on local interests, there is no practical reason to view the
contemporary water cases as turning on property principles."l
Ultimately, from the 1800s up until the early 1900s, American
jurisprudence was at the least conflicted. 13 As one scholar wrote at the
time, there "are some who, assum[e] that the United States had a
property in the waters.2 z14 This was in accord with the Court's tendency
to stay firmly grounded in core English common law theories. 15 It was
also in accord with the Court's commerce clause jurisprudence and the
national debate about state ownership of the public domain. 16 But this
concept conflicts with "Roman law, civil law, [and] common law"
which recognized that water should not be subject to "ownership. "217
This conflict can be seen in cases like Hudson, where the court treaded
carefully around calling state interest in water a "property" right.2 18 The
flux of the ownership theory was summarized near the turn of the
century by notable scholar and former head of the Bureau of
Reclamation, Elwood Mead:
If possible, the limits of State and Federal jurisdiction should be
more clearly defined. It has heretofore been assumed that the
authority of each State in the disposal of the water-supply within
its borders was unquestioned and supreme, and two of the States
have constitutional provisions asserting absolute ownership of
all water-supplies within their bounds. A recent decision of the
United States circuit court holds this view to be erroneous, and
in other litigation, the decisions have been of such a character as
to give rise to grave uncertainty as to what is to be the ultimate
settlement of this issue.219
After the turn of the century the Supreme Court began to expressly
settle the state ownership issue, revealing that states never "owned"
water or wild resources at all.22 It was a mere fiction, or stand-in, for
Trelease also points out that states during this early period relied on their plenary police powers to
apportion water between their own citizens, not a state title tracing theory. Id.
212 See supra notes 206 08 and accompanying text.
213 Ward Bannister, The Question of Federal Disposition of State Waters in Priority States, 28
HARV. L. REV. 270, 280 (1915) (noting that the question of sovereign ownership of water, at least
before the Supreme Court, was an "open" question).
214 Id. at 283.
215 See supra note 149 and accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 206 08 and accompanying text.
217 See Bannister, supra note 213, at 286.
218 See Hudson Cnty. Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 354 57 (1908).
219 ELWOOD MEAD, IRRIGATION INSTITUTIONS 372 (1903).
220 See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920); see also Cal.-Or. Power Co. v.
Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142, 158, 163 64 (1935) (stating the act "effected a
severance of all waters upon the public domain ... from the land itself," and that therefore "all
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the police power states hold to regulate common resources. McCreedy
ended up being the high water mark for state ownership of wild
resources and perhaps high above the water mark.221 Every time the
states have tried to raise some sort of ownership theory over water and
other wild resources since McCreedy, they have sorely lost.222 Indeed,
the state wild resources ownership theory has been trounced in a
number of different contexts.223
In fact, as early as 1920, state ownership theories were drowning.2 4
In Missouri v. Holland, Missouri sought to escape the reach of the
Migratory Bird Act by claiming an ownership interest in the birds
within its state borders.2 2 ' The Court rejected Missouri's position, noting
first that the states have "regulatory" power over the birds vis-a-vis
citizens of their state.2 6 But then going on to explain that it "does not
follow that its authority is exclusive of paramount powers. 22 ' The Court
then expressed its skepticism that a wild resource can be owned by a
state:
To put the claim of the State upon title is to lean upon a slender
reed. Wild birds are not in the possession of anyone; and
possession is the beginning of ownership. The whole foundation
non-navigable waters then a part of the public domain became publici juris, subject to the plenary
control of the designated states").
221 It turns out the U.S. Supreme Court's modem cases were perhaps more intuitive than even
the court realized. The decision that states can't own water under the early court's
conceptualization of derivative ownership on behalf of a state's citizens now makes sense in light
of state law cases because, as discussed below: individuals can't "own" water either.
222 Reed D. Benson, Deflating the Deference Myth: National Interests vs. State Authority
Under Federal Laws Affecting Water Use, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 241, 254 (2006) (explaining that
"[o]ver the years, the states have advanced a variety of arguments to the effect that the
Constitution somehow prevents the federal government from intruding on their sovereignty over
water" but that these arguments have largely failed).
223 Julia R. Wilder, The Great Lakes As A Water Resource: Questions of Ownership and
Control, 59 IND. L.J. 463, 473 (1984) (discussing that, under the Supreme Court's jurisprudence
after the turn of the century, it became clear that "[g]overnment ownership of water is actually a
legal fiction which supports the state's regulatory powers, a fiction expressive in legal shorthand
of the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the exploitation of
an important resource" (citations omitted)); Goldberg, supra note 208, at 38 (discussing how the
"ownership of water" is a "bit of legal mysticism" and that the "confusion between the attributes
of ownership and authority has persisted to this day").
224 As early as fifteen years after McCready, the U.S. Supreme Court had called into question
the theory that states could own wild resources such as swimming fish. See Manchester v.
Massachusetts, 139 U.S. 240, 265 (1881).
225 252 U.S. 416, 431 (1920). Notably, the Court had previously upheld a state's right to
control the disposition of gamebirds on an ownership theory. See Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232
U.S. 138 (1914). This was before the Migratory Bird Treaty had been passed, however, which
indicates that perhaps the Court was willing to recognize some sort of state ownership in the birds
absent the federal government having a direct interest.
226 Holland, 252 U.S. at 434.
227 Id.
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of the State's rights is the presence within their jurisdiction of
birds that yesterday had not arrived, tomorrow may be in
another State and in a week a thousand miles away.228
The Court thus focused on the wild nature of the birds in suggesting
that, perhaps, the state could not own migratory birds in the first place.
It is difficult to see how water, flowing constantly across a watercourse
or between underground aquifers, could be treated under a different
standard.
By the 1940s the Court had rejected the state ownership theory
altogether.2 29 Toomer addressed a challenge to South Carolina's
shrimping statute which clearly discriminated against citizens of other
states.23 ' The defendants, unsurprisingly, touted McCready, contending
that South Carolina's ownership of the shrimp, on behalf of its citizens,
was a privileges and immunities shield. 31
The Court first distinguished McCready because the Court there
addressed stationary oysters planted in beds, whereas Toomer addressed
migratory shrimp.23 2 Like they did in Missouri, the Court found
important the fact that the shrimp at issue here were "migratory. 233 But
the Court then went farther, calling into question the entire concept of
states owning wild resources: "The whole ownership theory, in fact, is
now generally regarded as but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of
the importance to its people that a State have power to preserve and
regulate the exploitation of an important resource. '234 The Court thus
explained that when courts say states "own" wild resources, they really
mean that states have power to regulate the resource vis-di-vis their own
citizens.
After Toomer, the Court continued to reject state ownership theories
over wild resources in dormant commerce clause cases. 236 The Court
continued to reject state ownership theories when a state violated the
228 Id.
229 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
230 Id. at 388.
231 Id. at 395.
232 Id. at 401.
233 Id.
234 Id. at 402.
235 Indeed, the Court seemed to call into question whether MeCready should remain good law:
"These considerations lead us to the conclusion that the MeCready exception to the privileges and
immunities clause, if such it be, should not be expanded to cover this case." Id.
236 See Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 8 (1928) (holding that Louisiana
could not use an ownership theory to require the local processing of shrimp taken from
Louisiana); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 420 21 (1948) (holding that an
ownership theory over fish could not save California's attempt to prevent certain residents from
fishing); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co.,
221 U.S. 229, (1911).
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privileges and immunity clause. 3 The Court continued to reject state
ownership theories where federal powers conflicted with state
"ownership" claims. 38 Indeed, the fiction of state ownership of wild
resources reached even Congress's attention:
[W]hat we really mean by this sort of 'ownership' is
sovereignty, not proprietorship .... One may not shoot the birds
or appropriate the water without a permit from the State, in its
exercise of the police power. Nevertheless, title does not come
from the State's permit, but from the act of reducing the birds or
the water to possession with the assent of the State as sovereign,
not as proprietor.
9
In the 1970s, the Court authored several opinions ending what debate
was left over a state ownership theory.240 In 1977, in Douglas v.
Seacoast Products, Inc., the Court rejected the argument that Virginia's
"ownership" of fish swimming in its territorial waters allowed the State
to forbid nonresidents from fishing.24 1 The Court pulled no punches this
time:
A State does not stand in the same position as the owner of a
private game preserve and it is pure fantasy to talk of 'owning'
wild fish, birds, or animals. Neither the States nor the Federal
Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman or hunter, has
title to these creatures.242
The Court put the early twentieth century cases in perspective: "The
'ownership' language of cases [such a Geery and McCready] ... must
be understood as no more than a 19th-century legal fiction. '24 3 The
Court concluded that a state's interest in wild resources is simply a
question of "police power. 244
Finally, in Hughes v. Oklahoma245 and Sporhase v. Nebraska,246 the
Court "traced the demise of the public ownership theory and definitively
recast it as 'but a fiction expressive in legal shorthand of the importance
237 Toomer, 334 U.S. at 400-01; Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 419 21.
238 Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 85 (1977); Kleppe v. New Mexico,
426 U.S. 529, 542-45 (1976).
239 Federal-State Water Rights: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
87th Cong. 118 (1961) (statement of Northcutt Ely, Washington, D.C.) (emphasis added).
240 See, e.g., Douglas, 431 U.S. at 265.
241 Id. at 284.
242 Id.
243 Id.
244 Id.
245 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
246 458 U.S. 941 (1982).
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to its people that a State have power to preserve and regulate the
exploitation of an important resource.-
247
Sporhase is worth considering further because it addressed a state's
interest in groundwater specifically. 24s The Court first recognized that
Geer had been overturned, which "signaled the demise of the state
ownership theory" over wild resources.249 It then considered whether the
nature of groundwater required a different approach.25 ' The Court
concluded it did not, explaining that the idea that a state can shield itself
by asserting ownership over water "is still based on the legal fiction of
state ownership. ' 251 The Court recognized the profound interest states,
especially western states, have in groundwater resources. 2  But the
Court clarified that these interests were just that, interests to be
calculated when applying doctrines that settle water and commerce
disputes,253 not ownership interests.2 5 4 The Court also explained that
groundwater implicates a number of important interstate and national
issues which further militate against viewing state groundwater as an
absolute property interest.255
In addition to the fact that the Court has explained that states do not
own wild resources such as fish and water itself,256 every time the
Supreme Court addresses an interstate dispute over water, it does not
engage in a property analysis.2 57 Indeed, the Supreme Court's rejection
of state ownership of water is foundational to the Court's doctrine of
equitable apportionment. When faced with competing claims to water
247 Id. at 95 1; see also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 334 35 (1979).
248 Sporhase, 458 U.S. at 951.
249 Id.
250 Id.
251 Id.
252 Id. at 952.
253 Id. at 953.
254 Id.
255 Id.; see also Frank J. Trelease, State Water and State Lines: Commerce in Water
Resources, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 347, 355 (1985) (noting that Sporhase listed several factors
which might militate in favor of deferring to state preferences over water: "(1) the state might act
to protect the health and safety of its citizens; (2) the state might have legal expectations created
by equitable apportionment or compact division of interstate streams; (3) the state's claim to
public ownership of ground water might be strong enough to support a limited preference for its
own citizens; and (4) to the extent that conservation made water available, the state might be
regarded as a producer of goods and might favor its own citizens in their distribution");
Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (not recognizing
Oklahoma's sovereign right to water within its borders).
256 See supra notes 148 63.
257 See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 630 (5th Cir. 2009)
("Determining Mississippi and Tennessee's relative rights to the Aquifer brings this case
squarely within the original development and application of the equitable apportionment
doctrine."); see also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259
U.S. 419 (1922); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
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and other shared resources,25 the Court uses equitable apportionment to
allocate respective rights, denying claims of absolute territorial control
and ownership." 9 This test has nothing to do with property ownership,
and everything to do with the public's interest in water.16' Further
dooming any ownership theory states may think they have, the Court
has also upheld the power of the federal government to reserve water
from the states (something that should be impossible if states own their
water).261
The conclusion to be drawn from the Court's modern jurisprudence is
clear and simple: states do not own water, neither by royal prerogative
nor on behalf of their citizens. Instead, states can regulate how their
citizens use water and other wild resources.2 62 This is not to say that
states do not have important interests in water, and a wide breadth of
power to regulate water within their borders, because they do. 6 ' But this
258 See Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1024 (1983) ("Although that doctrine
has its roots in water rights litigation, the natural resource of anadromous fish is sufficiently
similar to make equitable apportionment an appropriate mechanism for resolving allocative
disputes."). The Fifth Circuit noted this in reasoning that equitable apportionment applies to
groundwater. Hood, 570 F.3d at 630 n.6.
259 See, e.g., Evans, 462 U.S. at 1024.
260 See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
261 Beginning in Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Court has been
comfortable with allowing the federal government to reserve water from within state borders.
This case was predicated in part on the fact that the state had entered the union after the supposed
reservation of water for a Native American tribe. But this prior reservation theory is not always
present in federal reserve cases. See, e.g., Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 597 600 (1963).
Another hint at the Court's true view of state ownership of water can be found in United States v.
Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 427 (1940). There, challengers contended that a
federal hydropower license would conflict with "exercise of the police power of the states" over
water. The Court responded "[t]he Congressional authority under the commerce clause is
complete unless limited by the Fifth Amendment." Id.
262 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 36-02, 36-8 36-9 (Robert E. Beck, ed., 1991 ed.)
("[T]he Supreme Court has made it abundantly clear that it has little patience with claims of
absolute 'ownership' [of groundwater] by either [state or federal] government."); A. Dan Tarlock,
Takings, Water Rights, and Climate Change, 36 VT. L. REv. 731, 740 (2012) ("State ownership is
a fiction for the assertion of the power to regulate all aspects of use and enjoyment rather than an
assertion of full ownership."); see Idaho v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017, 1029 (1983) ("After Hughes
v. Oklahoma, however, Idaho cannot claim legal ownership of the fish. While the origin of the
fish may be a factor in the fashioning of an equitable decree, it cannot by itself establish the need
for a decree." (citation omitted)); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. All Parties, 306 P.2d 824, 840 41
(1957) ("Likewise the state is not the owner of the domestic water of the state in the sense that it
has absolute power and dominion over it to the exclusion of the rights of those who have the
beneficial interest therein.").
263 Indeed, Chief Justice Burger remained skeptical of how far the Court had cut back the
ownership theory. In a concurring opinion in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n of Montana, 436
U.S. 371, 392 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring), he noted
A State does not 'own' wild birds and animals in the same way that it may own other
natural resources such as land, oil, or timber. But, as noted in the Court's opinion, and
contrary to the implications of the dissent, the doctrine is not completely obsolete. It
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interest is not one borne of property. States clearly have the right, and
duty, to regulate waters within their boundaries. But to call this a public
"trust," in the sense that the state holds title in water, does not align with
civilization's earliest concepts about owning wild resources like water,
and it does not align with the Court's modern jurisprudence. 64 Cases
may have occasionally used the term "title" or "ownership" but the
Supreme Court has been careful to clarify what it meant. The Court
even in its earliest, state-friendly era tip-toed around sovereign
ownership of water. In modern cases, the Court is outright hostile to the
concept.
IV. STATE GROUNDWATER LAW
Mississippi's argument that it owns groundwater like a piece of
chattel is not only out of alignment with federal law, it is out of
alignment with state law as well. Mississippi's ownership theory would
require the Supreme Court to adopt a radically new doctrine for
groundwater law that is entirely at odds with the common law of
groundwater as developed and applied by the states.
State courts routinely deal with disputes over groundwater pumping
that lowers the water table in surrounding areas, with alleged damage to
neighboring properties. In contrast to the approach urged by
Mississippi, state courts generally recognize that groundwater is not
divisible based on overlying property lines, but rather is a shared
resource that must be utilized by all parties based on reasonable use and
other equitable principles Oust like surface water).266
manifests the State's special interest in regulating and preserving wildlife for the
benefit of its citizens.
Id.
264 Indeed, skepticism of state ownership theories continues in full force today. See, e.g.,
Osherenko, supra note 124, at 331; Robin Kundis Craig, A Comparative Guide to the Eastern
Public Trust Doctrines: Classifications of States, Property Rights, and State Summaries, 16 PENN
ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 99 (2007); 78 AM. JUR. 2D WATERS § 4 ("A state does not have the right to
possess and use water to the exclusion of others... [t]he State's interest, therefore, is not an
ownership interest but rather a nonproprietary, regulatory one. The State's interest in the public
groundwater and surface waters is to make a water policy that preserves and regulates it.");
Nicole L. Johnson, Property Without Possession, 24 YALE J. REG. 205, 217 (2007).
265 See, e.g., Prohosky v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 584 F. Supp. 1337, 1341, 1343,
decision rev'd 767 F.2d 387 (7th Cir. 1985); Reppun v. Board of Water Supply, 656 P.2d 57, 73
(Haw. 1985); Natural Resources Com'n v. AMAX Coal Co., 603 N.E.2d 1349, 1354 55 (Ind.
App. 1994).
266 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979); ADLER ET AL., supra note 16, at ch.
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As with surface water doctrines, the common law for groundwater
varies by state, with some divisions between the East and the West.
2 61
State courts have centuries of experience and resulting rules that govern
the allocation of groundwater and resolution of groundwater pumping
disputes.2 6' There are five distinct common law groundwater doctrines
that states have used to resolve groundwater disputes: (1) the doctrine of
capture; (2) American reasonable use; (3) correlative rights; (4)
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 858; and (5) prior
appropriation.169 In some states, these doctrines have faded into the legal
background in favor of modern legislative and administrative schemes
that regulate groundwater use. ° However, the particular justifications
for groundwater apportionment embedded in these doctrines are still
relevant today and have been incorporated into most modern
groundwater management schemes." Consequently, a short overview
of each common law doctrine will be useful for putting Mississippi's
flawed arguments into context.
The doctrine of capture is the oldest groundwater doctrine in the
United States, originating from the English rule of capture established in
Acton v. Blundell.2 In this case, the owner of a cotton mill sued the
owner of a nearby coal mine, alleging that the defendant's mining
operations had wrongfully drained the water from wells on the
plaintiffs land. 3 At the time of the case, very little was known about
the occurrence and movement of groundwater.7 4 As the court described,
"[groundwater] does not flow openly in sight of the neighboring
proprietor, but through hidden veins of the earth beneath its surface...
[thus,] no proprietor knows what portion of water is taken from beneath
his own soil: how much he gives originally, or how much he transmits
only, or how much he receives .... 127 5 With this understanding (or lack
267 See WILLIS H. ELLIS, WATER RIGHTS: WHAT THEY ARE AND How THEY ARE CREATED,
13 RMMLF-INST 18 (1967) (explaining that east-west legal divide is not as pronounced in the
context of groundwater, but that there is significant variation across states).
268 See, e.g., Actonv. Blundell, (1843) 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 12 Mees. & Wels. 324.
269 Noah D. Hall, Protecting Freshwater Resources in the Era of Global Water Markets:
Lessons Learned from Bottled Water, 13 U. DENY. WATER L. REV. 1, 23 24 (2009); see also
Joseph W. Dellapenna, A Primer on Groundwater Law, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 265, 269 (2013). Prior
appropriation is only relevant in western states and not discussed further in this analysis. See, e.g.,
Bower v. Moorman, 147 P. 496, 499 (Id. 1915) (applying rule of prior appropriation to ground
water dispute).
270 See Dellapenna supra note 269, at 302.
271 See id.
272 Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1235.
273 Id.
274 See Dellapenna, supra note 269, at 271 (noting "the rule initially drew support from the
pervasive ignorance regarding what was happening underground").
275 Acton, 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233.
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thereof), the court held in favor of the mine owner, stating that the
inconvenience to the owner of the cotton mill-namely, the interception
and draining of groundwater from his wells was damnum absque
injuria (loss without legal harm) and could not form the basis for a legal
claim.
27 6
The doctrine of capture functions to establish title to personal
property wild animals, fish, and sometimes oil and gas once those
resources are brought within the physical control of the owner. 77 The
same is true for groundwater: a pumper owns (has title to) all the
groundwater that he or she pumps out of the ground, with the pumping
constituting the legal act of capture.27 ' Note that ownership of water
once "captured" from groundwater is not at all equivalent to owning the
groundwater itself, just like owning a fish caught from a stream in no
way conveys ownership in the fish in the stream that flows past one's
property. 279
Further, as Acton v. Blundell illustrates, the doctrine of capture in
groundwater law also encompasses a tort rule of liability. In essence, the
doctrine of capture is a doctrine of non-liability.2 "0 A landowner who
withdraws groundwater from beneath the surface of his land cannot be
held liable to adjacent landowners for the injuries that those withdrawals
cause.2 11 While this doctrine has many policy flaws and is based on
outdated ignorance about groundwater science, it shows that from the
earliest disputes, property owners never had an absolute right or
ownership interest in the groundwater below their land. 282
Though modem understanding of groundwater hydrology has
lessened this rule's popularity, the doctrine of capture still survives in a
handful of states, including Maine, 3 and Texas. s4 Nearly 100 years
later, the Texas Supreme Court explicitly affirmed the doctrine. There
276 Id. at 1235.
277 See id.
278 See id.; see also Dellapenna, supra note 269, at 271.
279 See Dellapenna, supra note 269, at 273.
280 152 Eng. Rep. at 1233.
281 Id.
282 See Maddocks v. Giles, 728 A.2d 150, 153 54 (1999); Hall, supra note 269, at 41.
283 See, e.g., Maddocks, 728 A.2d at 153.
284 See Houston & Texas Center Ry. Co. v. East, 81 S.W. 279 (Tex. 1904).
285 Sipriano v. Great Spring Waters of America, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 75 (Tex. 1999). It should be
noted that while the rule of capture was left in place for resolving disputes between private
property owners in Texas, the Texas Supreme Court seems to have established a property rule for
private groundwater rights in the context of a takings claim arising from regulatory restrictions on
groundwater pumping.
In our state the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the
[water] in place beneath his land. The only qualification of that rule of ownership is
that it must be considered in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police
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are a few exceptions to this rule. The first bars application of the
doctrine for malicious groundwater withdrawals where it appears that a
landowner is taking groundwater "for the sole purpose of injuring his
neighbor, or [is] wantonly and willfully wast[ing] [the water]. 286 The
second exception applies to cases where a landowner's negligence
"proximate[ly] cause[s] the subsidence of [another's land].""2 7
Most states began to evolve away from the rule of capture with an
early doctrine termed American reasonable use."' Essentially, the
doctrine is the same as the rule of capture, but with the added
requirement that the groundwater withdrawn be put to a reasonable use
on the overlying tract."9 As state water law evolved, the harsh non-
liability rules of capture have given way to more equitable and balanced
rules of correlative rights. 9 The correlative rights doctrine originated in
California at the beginning of the 20th century, when intense
agricultural use of groundwater began to spark disputes between
neighboring landowners. 91 The correlative rights doctrine borrows
heavily from riparianism, with a shared ight of reasonable use among
property owners above an aquifer. 92
In essence, the correlative rights doctrine grants each landowner
whose property is located over a common groundwater source a right to
the reasonable use of a "fair and just portion" of that groundwater in
connection with his or her overlying land. 93 Groundwater may be
withdrawn for off-tract or non-overlying uses under this doctrine, but
only in the event that "surplus" water is available that is, in
circumstances where the groundwater recharge rate exceeds the
groundwater withdrawal rate, and the surplus water is not needed by
regulations. The [water] beneath the soil are considered a part of the realty. Each owner
of land owns separately, distinctly and exclusively all the [water] under his land and is
accorded the usual remedies against trespassers who appropriate the [water] or destroy
[its] market value.
Edwards Aquifer Authority v. Day, 369 S.W.3d 814, 831 32 (Tex. 2012).
286 City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton, 276 S.W.2d 798, 801 (Tex. 1955).
287 Friendswood Dev. Co. v. Smith-Southwest Indus., Inc., 576 S.W.2d 21, 30 (Tex. 1978).
288 See Dellapenna, supra note 269, at 269; see also Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1249
(R.I. 1982); State v. Michels Pipeline Const., Inc., 217 N.W.2d 339, 345 (Wis. 1974); see also
Spear T Ranch, Inc. v. Knaub, 691 N.W.2d 116, 131 33 (Neb. 2005).
289 See, e.g., McDowell v. Rural Water Dist. No. 2, 282 N.W.2d 594, 596 (Neb. 1979); Jones
v. Oz-Ark-Val Poultry Co., 306 S.W.2d 111, 114 15 (Ark. 1957); FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Cos.,
72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467, 513 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998); City of Valparaiso v. Defier, 694 N.E.2d 1177,
1179 80 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998).
290 See, e.g., Bassett v. Salisbury Mfg. Co., 43 N.H. 569 (1862) (applying reasonable use).
291 See Katz v. Walkinshaw, 74 P. 766 (Cal. 1903).
292 See, e.g., ADLER ET AL., supra note 16, at 189; Dellapenna, supra note 269, at 274.
293 See Keith H. Hirokawa, Property as Capture and Care, 74 ALB. L. REv. 175, 216 18
(2010).
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overlying owners.294 During times of shortage, groundwater use is
restricted to use on the overlying properties and, among those uses, is
generally apportioned based on equitable factors.295 As such, in most
respects the correlative rights doctrine may be properly considered the
groundwater equivalent of riparian rights.
Most recently, the American Law Institute in 1978 took on the issue
of groundwater for the Restatement (Second) of Torts.296
Fundamentally, the Restatement adopts the concept of correlative rights,
viewing groundwater as a connected shared resource and applying
riparian reasonable use principles. 97 The drafters were concentrating on
liability for groundwater pumping, not on property law; the basic
property rule remains that a pumper owns the water that he or she
withdraws and "captures." '2 9' As a result, section 858 of the Second
Restatement deals exclusively with liability associated with the use of
groundwater. 99 Under this section, a groundwater user who puts the
withdrawn water to beneficial use will not be liable for harm to others
caused by her withdrawals unless:
(a) the withdrawal of groundwater unreasonably causes harm to
a proprietor of neighboring land through lowering the water
table or reducing artesian pressure,
(b) the withdrawal of groundwater exceeds the proprietor's
reasonable share of the annual supply or total store of ground
water, or
(c) the withdrawal of the groundwater has a direct and
substantial effect upon a watercourse or lake and unreasonably
causes harm to a person entitled to the use of its water. 00
In evaluating the comparative reasonableness of competing uses, the
Restatement considers the same factors that apply to reasonable use
riparianism in surface water. The elements to determine reasonable uses
are set forth in section 850A of the Restatement, providing:
The determination of the reasonableness of a use of water
depends upon a consideration of the interests of the riparian
proprietor making the use, of any riparian proprietor harmed by
294 See Ronald Kaiser & Frank F. Skillern, Deep Trouble: Options for Managing the Hidden
Threat ofAquifer Depletion in Texas, 32 TEX. TECH L. REV. 249, 280 (2001).
295 See, e.g., Tehachapi-Cummings Cnty. Water Dist. v. Armstrong, 122 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924
25 (Ct. App. 1975).
296 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 858 (1979).
297 See id.
298 The Restatement's comments discuss the doctrine in context of"tortious withdrawal." Id.
299 Id.
300 Id.
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it and of society as a whole. Factors that affect the determination
include the following:
(a) The purpose of the use,
(b) the suitability of the use to the watercourse or lake,
(c) the economic value of the use,
(d) the social value of the use,
(e) the extent and amount of the harm it causes,
(f) the practicality of avoiding the harm by adjusting the
use or method of use of one proprietor or the other,
(g) the practicality of adjusting the quantity of water
used by each proprietor,
(h) the protection of existing values of water uses, land,
investments and enterprises, and
(i) the justice of requiring the user causing harm to bear
the loss.3 01
Both Tennessee and Mississippi similarly settle private groundwater
disputes using equitable principles, not ownership ones. Mississippi,
like many states today, created an administrative system to manage
water use and conflicts. 2 The agency considers who owns overlying
property only as a marginal factor among a slew of equitable principles,
including "how the permit applicant plans to use the water,... the
amount of water requested,.... whether the wells will be spaced in a
manner to avoid interference with existing wells,... and the projected
drawdown of the aquifer."3 3 For example, the Court in Riverbend
Utilities v. Mississippi Environmental Quality Permit Board, analyzed
the "beneficial uses" the litigants were putting their water to."°
Mississippi's regulations explain that: "In areas where conflicts exist
between competing interests or demands for ... groundwater supplies,
or where there is a potential for such conflicts to arise in the future,...
beneficial uses ... will be given priority."3 5 These uses include the
public supply needs, industrial needs, conservation of habitats, fire
protection, and any other uses relevant on a case-by-case basis.30 6
Indeed, ownership of the overlying property is not even listed as among
the priority factors for settling ground water disputes.07
301 Id. § 850A.
302 See Riverbend Utilities, Inc. v. Mississippi Envtl. Quality Permit Bd., 130 So. 3d 1096,
1104 (Miss. 2014).
303 Id. at 1104-05.
304 Id. at 1104.
305 11.7-1 MIss. CODE R. § 1.4(B) (LexisNexis 2014).
306 Id.
307 Id.
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Tennessee also uses equitable principles, not ownership ones, to
settle water disputes."' The state is generally considered a "correlative
rights" state thus applying equitable principles to groundwater
disputes." 9 An early Tennessee groundwater law explained that
the modem rule and the better rule is that the rights of each
owner being similar, and their enjoyment dependent on the
action of other landowners, their right must be correlative and
subject to the maxim that one must so use his own as not to
injure another, so that each landowner is restricted to a
reasonable exercise of his own rights and a reasonable use of his
own property, in view of the similar rights of others.310
The Court then announced that it adopted the "American" or
"reasonable use" rule, rejecting a "doctrine of unqualified and absolute
right of a landowner to intercept and draw from his land the percolating
waters therein." '311 Tennessee also has some agency involvement that
triggers other equitable considerations for certain types of large
groundwater pumping. 12
Thus, the law of groundwater ranges from rules of capture to
equitable balancing of competing uses and harms. In no state does the
law of groundwater support Mississippi's arguments for absolute
ownership of groundwater as a divisible resource based on ownership of
overlying land. Indeed, neither Mississippi nor Tennessee have adopted
such a theory to allocate water within their own borders. Instead, both
states have recognized that groundwater rights are merely usufructuary
and correlative with the rights of neighbors. The Supreme Court should
apply the same correlative rights and equitable approach provided by
the states and summarized in the Restatement. Conveniently, and not
coincidentally, this is quite compatible with both equitable
apportionment and the interstate nuisance doctrine, as discussed in the
following two sections.
V. EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
As the above sections detail, states do not "own" water, and an
ownership theory is an untenable means of settling Mississippi's
dispute. The Supreme Court should make this clear (again) and then
308 See, e.g., Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Rickert, 89 S.W.2d 889, 897 (Tenn.
Ct. App. 1935).
309 SeeId.; see also Comment, Water Rights in Tennessee, 27 TENN. L. REV. 557 (1960).
310 Rickert, 89 S.W.2d at 896.
311 Id. at 897.
312 TENN. COMP. R. & REGS. 0400-45-08-.05 (2015).
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look to equitable apportionment, or preferably interstate nuisance, to
address the present dispute of shared interstate groundwater.
Before exploring the details and applicability of equitable
apportionment (and the alternative interstate nuisance doctrine
discussed in the next part), it is important to put the role of the Supreme
Court in resolving interstate water disputes into a federalism context.
When water resources cross state lines and are subject to competing
interstate legal claims and uses, federal involvement becomes necessary.
There are three ways to manage and allocate interstate waters in our
federal system. First, the federal government, through an act of
Congress, can establish rules for use of interstate waters or even
apportion specific water resources (such as an aquifer) among the
states. 13 Congress has broad power over interstate waters, and while it
has rarely exercised that power for managing and allocating interstate
water quantities, 14 it has taken a central role in protecting interstate
water quality through the Clean Water Act. 15
Second, and most commonly, interstate waters can be managed
through an interstate compact. A compact is essentially a contract
between states, subject to federal approval, 16 as provided in the U.S.
Constitution.1 The Supreme Court has made clear its preference for
interstate compacts as the best mechanism for addressing interstate
water disputes, which are "more likely to be wisely solved by
cooperative study and by conference and mutual concession on the part
of representatives of the States so vitally interested in it than by
proceedings in any court however constituted.""31 There are over two
dozen interstate water compacts in effect in the United States, covering
such important shared waters as the Great Lakes and Colorado River,
and some of these compacts consider interconnected groundwater
resources."' More specifically, Utah and Nevada have negotiated a
proposed compact to manage and protect the Snake Valley Aquifer from
313 See Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 564 66 (1963).
314 Congress has only twice used its power to apportion water. See Boulder Canyon Project
Act, Pub. L. No. 70-642, 45 Stat. 1057 (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 617-617u (2012));
Truckee-Carson-Pyramid Lake Water Rights Settlement Act, Pub. L. No. 101-618, § 204, 104
Stat. 3294, 3296 304 (1990).
315 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 1376 (2012).
316 See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
317 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,... enter
into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power.").
318 New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296, 313 (1921).
319 See Noah D. Hall, Interstate Water Compacts and Climate Change Adaptation, 5 ENVTL.
& ENERGY L. & POL'Y J. 237, 239 40, 248 51, 252 53, 284 86 (2010).
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development for municipal water supply, which could be a model for
Mississippi-Tennessee and other regions.32
When the first two options Congressional apportionment and
interstate compacts are not exercised (typically for political
reasons),321 interstate water conflicts fall to the Supreme Court, which
has exclusive jurisdiction for disputes between states.322 In resolving
disputes involving shared surface waters, the Supreme Court has
developed and applied the doctrine of equitable apportionment323 and
interstate nuisance.324 While there are some differences between surface
water and groundwater law, the resources and policy concerns are
similar enough that equitable apportionment could easily be adopted
and applied rationally in an interstate groundwater dispute, as already
demonstrated by the Fifth Circuit.2 5
Equitable apportionment rests on two related rationales. The first,
explained by Justice Holmes, is a practical one: water is a "necessity of
life that must be rationed among those who have power over it," and
where two states "have real and substantial interests" in interstate water,
those interests "must be reconciled as best they may be." '326 The second,
derived from our constitutional scheme and international law,32 respects
the states as sovereigns: the sovereign states are juridical equals and
have "equality of right" among them. 2 ' Because of this, whenever
320 See generally Hall & Cavataro, supra note 4.
321 See id. at 1570 72, 1601 07.
322 The original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to adjudicate interstate disputes stems from
the Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. III, §§ 1, 2 ("The Judicial Power [of the United States] shall
extend ... to Controversies between two or more States ...."), while the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court to hear such disputes stems from statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2012) ("The Supreme
Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction of all controversies between two or more
States.").
323 See generally Colorado v. New Mexico (Colorado II), 467 U.S. 310 (1984); Colorado v.
New Mexico (Colorado 1), 459 U.S. 176 (1982).
324 See generally Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S.
426 (1967); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696
(1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
325 See Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 632 (5th Cir. 2009).
326 New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336, 342 43 (1931).
327 The principle that the states of the United States are juridically equal is analogous to the
international-law principle that sovereign states are juridically equal to one another. See Thomas
H. Lee, Making Sense of the Eleventh Amendment: International Law and State Sovereignty, 96
Nw. U. L. REV. 1027, 1027 33 (2002) (noting that "the Founders understood the States as
sovereign entities bound together in an interdependent coexistence very much like the community
of nations," and suggesting that the Eleventh Amendment is "consistent with the sovereign
equality principle, presuming no difference between the sovereign dignity of a State and a nation-
state, a powerful statement in itself about the sovereign dignity of the American states"); see also
ROBERT A. KLEIN, SOVEREIGN EQUALITY AMONG STATES: THE HISTORY OF AN IDEA 143
(1974).
328 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907).
Interstate Groundwater Law Revisited
the action of one state reaches, through the agency of natural
laws, into the territory of another state, the question of the extent
and the limitations of the rights of the two states becomes a
matter of justiciable dispute between them, and this court is
called upon to settle that dispute in such a way as will recognize
the equal rights of both and at the same time establish justice
between them. 9
Of course, equality of right does not mean an "equal division of the
water," but instead means an "equal level or plane on which all the
states stand, in point of power and right, under our constitutional
system."330
Equitable apportionment is a doctrine of federal common law.331 The
Court defines it as "a flexible doctrine which calls for 'the exercise of
an informed judgment on a consideration of many factors to secure a
'just and equitable' allocation,"' taking into account "'the delicate
adjustment of interests which must be made."' 332 The Court has said it
approaches interstate water cases "[s]itting, as it were, as an
international, as well as a domestic, tribunal," and applying "[fjederal
law, state law, and international law, as the exigencies of the particular
case may demand .... ""
Determining what "equity" means in water law is both challenging
and adaptive.334 The adaptive nature of equity allows flexibility in a
range of highly fact-dependent and often technical interstate
apportionment cases, but makes articulating standards and deciding
cases difficult.335 The Court has, however, laid down a number of key
329 Id. at 97 98. This test, with its mention of "reaching through the agency of natural laws,"
indicates that any interstate flow resource, whether surface water, groundwater, or migratory fish,
may be subject to equitable apportionment. See supra Part IV.
330 Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419, 465 (1922).
331 Hinderlider v. LaPlata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938) (opinion
of Brandeis, J.) ("For whether the water of an interstate stream must be apportioned between the
two States is a question of 'federal common law' upon which neither the statutes nor the
decisions of either State can be conclusive."). Congress has the power to displace the federal
common law of equitable apportionment under its Commerce Clause powers, as it has displaced
the common law of nuisance for interstate water pollution by enacting the Clean Water Act. See
City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 317 19 (1981). But Congress has chosen not to do
so.
332 Colorado 1, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618
(1945)).
333 Kansasv. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 146 47 (1902).
334 For a consideration of meaning of equity in the water-law context, see Jason A. Robison &
Douglas S. Kenney, Equity and the Colorado River Compact, 42 ENVTL. L. 1157, 1174 81
(2012).
335 See Joseph W. Dellapenna, Interstate Struggles Over Rivers: The Southeastern States and
the Struggle Over the 'Hooch, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 828, 883 (2005) ("Finding a fair
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principles in the form of a multifactor balancing test that guides how it
will equitably apportion water.33 6 The Court has said that its aim is
"always to secure a just and equitable apportionment 'without quibbling
over formulas." 33" The Court will thus
consider all relevant factors, including "physical and climatic
conditions, the consumptive use of water in the several sections
of the river, the character and rate of return flows, the extent of
established uses, the availability of storage water, the practical
effect of wasteful uses on downstream areas, [and] the damage
to upstream areas as compared to the benefits to downstream
areas if a limitation is imposed on the former.338
The Court will look to the relevant state law doctrines but has
stressed that "state law is not controlling" and that "the just
apportionment of interstate waters is a question of federal law that
depends 'upon a consideration of the pertinent laws of the contending
States and all other relevant facts."'339 The Court has continued to
reaffirm that "equitable apportionment... should turn on the benefits,
harms, and efficiencies of competing uses .... ,3 4o At the same time, the
Court has continued to give teeth to the requirement that the state
seeking a diversion prove
by clear and convincing evidence, the existence of certain
relevant factors .... [F]or example, the extent to which
reasonable conservation measures can adequately compensate
for the reduction in supply due to the diversion, and the extent to
which the benefits from the diversion will outweigh the harms
to existing users.341
Additionally, "[tihis evidentiary burden cannot be met with
generalizations about unidentified conservation measures and unstudied
speculation about future uses. 3 42  Thus, the Court has retained
significant roles for both utilitarian analysis and for preservation of
historic rights.
apportionment of the water between two or more competing states is as difficult as devising a
reasonable apportionment of water between two competing private riparian users.").
336 For an excellent overview of the application of the equitable apportionment doctrine, see
A. Dan Tarlock, The Law of Equitable Apportionment Revisited, Updated, and Restated, 56 U.
COLO. L. REv. 381, 392 (1985).
337 Colorado I, 459 U.S. 176, 183 (1982) (quoting New Jersey v. New York, 283 U.S. 336,
343 (1931) (opinion of Holmes, J.)).
338 Id. at 183 (quoting Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589, 618 (1945)).
339 Id. at 184 (quoting Connecticut v. Massachusetts, 282 U.S. 660, 670 71 (1931)).
340 Colorado II, 467 U.S. 310, 323 (1984).
341 Id. at 323 24.
342 Id. at 324.
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Although the Supreme Court has never before explicitly adjudicated
an interstate dispute over groundwater,343 it has considered groundwater
issues within the equitable apportionment of groundwater-connected
surface water. Over a century ago, the Supreme Court recognized that
groundwater flowing alongside the Arkansas River should be treated as
part of the flow of the river in an interstate equitable apportionment
case. 44 Moreover, the Court has applied the equitable-apportionment
doctrine in an interstate dispute outside of the water context; in Idaho ex
rel. Evans v. Oregon,345  the Court held that interstate runs of
anadromous fish, such as salmon and steelhead trout, were a resource
that could be equitably apportioned, explicitly drawing parallels to
water law.346
In sum, there is no barrier to the Court simply adopting its existing
equitable apportionment doctrine into the groundwater context. An
interstate groundwater dispute raises similar issues, presents no bar to
justiciability, and affords the Court with the flexibility to consider all
relevant interests of both state sovereigns. The doctrine allows the Court
to balance sovereign interests, especially for consumptive use of the
water resource. Relying on the weight of precedent for support, the co-
author in a prior article detailed the applicability of the equitable
apportionment doctrine to groundwater with a case study on the Snake
Valley Aquifer dispute between Utah and Nevada, involving potential
harms from pumping for Las Vegas municipal water supply. 47 Yet the
Supreme Court's grant of leave to Mississippi gives pause and reason to
revisit the assumed applicability of equitable apportionment to
groundwater, and opens the door to an alternative to both Mississippi's
strained arguments of ownership and conversion and the implied
questioning of equitable apportionment the doctrine of interstate
nuisance.
343 Justin Newell Hesser, The Nature of Interstate Groundwater Resources and the Need for
States to Effectively Manage the Resource Through Interstate Compacts, 11 WYO. L. REV. 25, 36
(2011) ("The Supreme Court has only equitably apportioned interstate surface waters."); A. Dan
Tarlock & Darcy Alan Frownfelter, State Groundwater Sovereignty After Sporhase: The Case of
the Hueco Bolson, 43 OKLA. L. REV. 27, 27 (1990) ("[T]he United States Supreme Court had
never directly equitably apportioned an aquifer.").
344 Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 114 15 (1907); see also Washington v. Oregon, 297 U.S.
517, 524 26 (1936) (surface waters in dispute were hydrologically connected to subterranean
waters, and the reasonableness of well-pumping was part of the conflict).
345 462 U.S. 1017 (1983).
346 Id. at 1024 ("Although that doctrine has its roots in water rights litigation, the natural
resource of anadromous fish is sufficiently similar to make equitable apportionment an
appropriate mechanism for resolving allocative disputes."). The Fifth Circuit noted this in
reasoning that equitable apportionment applies to groundwater. Hood ex rel. Mississippi v. City
of Memphis, 570 F.3d 625, 630 n.6 (5th Cir. 2009).
347 See Hall & Cavataro, supra note 4.
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VI. INTERSTATE NUISANCE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO EQUITABLE
APPORTIONMENT
The other option for the Court is to fashion another established
doctrine to resolve interstate groundwater disputes. Mississippi attempts
to limit equitable apportionment to disputes involving a flowing river
from an upstream to a downstream state, but even if this distinction
were accepted, it doesn't apply to interstate nuisance law. Interstate
nuisance has been widely applied by the Supreme Court to standing
bodies of water, airsheds, and other resources that when utilized by one
state, result in harm to another state.14' The line of Missouri v. Illinois
and Wisconsin v. Illinois cases discussed below are especially applicable
and instructive.
The Missouri v. Illinois3 49 cases gave the Supreme Court its first
opportunity to consider an interstate environmental harm dispute. 50
Like the present dispute, the basic facts were that one state's use of its
natural resources caused alleged harm and damage to a neighboring
state. 51 Prior to 1900, Chicago's considerable sewage, stockyard, and
industrial wastes were discharged into Lake Michigan via the Chicago
River. 52 In 1889, the State of Illinois created a Sanitary District which,
acting as an agent of the state, subsequently undertook several drainage
projects involving the Chicago River. 53 One of these projects involved
the construction of an artificial channel, diverting the flow of the south
branch of the Chicago River away from its natural drainage into Lake
Michigan and toward the Des Plaines River, which in turn emptied into
the Mississippi River via the Illinois River. 54
The state of Missouri, located downriver from the point at which the
Illinois River emptied into the Mississippi River, filed suit in the
Supreme Court alleging harm to Missouri towns and citizens situated on
the Mississippi River, and seeking an injunction against the use of the
channel for waste disposal purposes. 5 The suit relied primarily on a
common law theory of nuisance, buttressed with a claim that Illinois
was also violating riparian principles by diverting water out of its
348 See, e.g., Missouri v. Illinois (Missouri I1), 200 U.S. 496 (1906); Missouri v. Illinois
(Missouri 1), 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
349 Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 496; Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 208.
350 See Noah D. Hall, Political Externalities, Federalism, and a Proposal for an Interstate
Environmental Impact Assessment Policy, 32 HARV. ENVTL L. REV. 49, 62 (2008).
351 See Missouri 1, 180 U.S. at 212.
352 See id.
353 See id. at 210 11.
354 See id. at 208, 211; MissouriJJ, 200 U.S. at 517.
355 See Missouri 1, 180 U.S. at 216; Missouri 11, 200 U.S. at 517.
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natural watershed. 5 6 Missouri was primarily concerned that Illinois'
waste was causing typhoid fever deaths among Missouri citizens. The
Court ultimately decided the case on the merits of the nuisance claim,
and did not entertain the riparian diversion allegation as a sufficient
basis for the suit. 57
Illinois first responded by filing a demurrer alleging both lack of
jurisdiction under the Constitution's Article III "case or controversy"
requirement and lack of adequate pleading. 5 The Supreme Court first,
in Missouri I, held that it was the proper forum for these types of
interstate disputes,359 when "[s]tates are in direct antagonism as
States. 36' This holding became the first jurisdictional standard for the
Supreme Court to hear an interstate environmental dispute. The
Missouri II court subsequently confirmed the Missouri I jurisdictional
requirements of state action and direct antagonism, and added two
additional requirements. First, the case must "be of serious magnitude,
clearly and fully proved. '3 61 Second, the case must be susceptible to
judicial resolution. 62 Harm to any of a state's traditional sovereign
interests, such as the property, health, safety, and welfare of its citizens,
would provide a sufficient basis for suit against another state.
63
Additionally, indirect action by a state or direct action by a state's entity
or subdivision (e.g., the Chicago Sanitary District) would satisfy the
state action requirement. 64
With the Court's jurisdiction established, the Missouri II court
addressed the substantive merits of Missouri's nuisance claim.
Ultimately, as in so many environmental disputes, Missouri's claim was
undermined by the lack of technical and scientific certainty regarding its
allegations and other equitable factors. The Court held that Missouri
could not make an adequate proof of causation because the scientific
evidence presented could not establish Illinois' discharge of sewage into
the Chicago River as the sole or primary source of pollution in the
Mississippi River.3 65 Justice Holmes's conclusion relies on two themes
repeated throughout the opinion: technical complexity regarding novel
scientific issues and the complication of potentially harmful conduct by
356 See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 212; Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 526.
357 See Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 526.
358 See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at216 18.
359 Id. at 241.
360 Id. at 249 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting).
361 MissourilI, 200 U.S. at 521.
362 See id.
363 See Missouri I, 180 U.S. at 236 37, 241.
364 See id. at 237 38, 241.
365 Missouri II, 200 U.S. at 526.
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the plaintiff state itself (cities in Missouri also discharged waste to
waterways).
The Supreme Court has since expanded its application of interstate
nuisance to alleged harms in a neighboring state to private property
through air pollution 66 and to riparian property through pumping of
standing bodies of water.367 One of these disputes, Wisconsin v. Illinois,
involves the same Chicago diversion that was the subject of litigation in
Missouri v. Illinois and is again particularly applicable and instructive
for the present dispute.
After Illinois prevailed against Missouri regarding the discharged
pollution, Wisconsin, Michigan, New York, and other Great Lakes
states brought another suit in the Supreme Court against Illinois. These
complainant states alleged that the Chicago diversion had lowered
levels in Lake Michigan, as well as Lakes Huron, Erie, and Ontario, by
more than six inches, harming navigation and causing serious injury to
their citizens and property. 6 8 Illinois again denied that the diversion
caused any actual injury. 69
The Supreme Court again relied on its doctrine of interstate nuisance
and the need to equitably balance the sovereign interests at stake in the
dispute. The Court did not consider the matter under equitable
apportionment, but many of the same issues of technical determinations
and consideration of equitable factors came into play."' Recognizing
the need for assistance in handling the complex technical issues being
raised, the Court appointed former Justice Charles Evan Hughes to
serve as special master." His report found that Chicago's diversion
lowered the levels of Lakes Michigan and Huron by six inches and
Lakes Erie and Ontario by five inches,37 2 causing damage "to navigation
and commercial interests, to structures, to the convenience of summer
resorts, to fishing and hunting grounds, to public parks and other
enterprises, and to riparian property generally.""3 3 The Court adopted the
special master's report, concluding that the reduced lake levels caused
366 Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 237 U.S. 474 (1915); Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230 (1907); see also Hall, supra note 9, at 690 91.
367 Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426 (1967);
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 696 (1930); Wisconsin
v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179 (1930); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367 (1929).
368 See Wisconsin, 278 U.S. at 399-400.
369 See id. at 400.
370 See Noah D. Hall, Toward A New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in
the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 421 22 (2006).
371 See id. at 420.
372 See id.
373 Id. at 420 21.
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the complainant states and their citizens and property owners "great
losses." '374
While generally supporting the technical claims of the complainant
states, the Court also appreciated the public health implications and
economic costs that would come with immediately halting the entire
Chicago diversion." 5 The Court thus referred the matter back to the
special master for determination of the proper relief, with consideration
of all of the equitable and practical factors in play.76 The special
master's report ultimately recommended a modest phased partial
reduction in the Chicago diversion, allowing the city time to build
adequate sewage treatment."'
Most instructively for the present dispute, the Court did not rely on
the limited doctrine of equitable apportionment but instead applied the
same process and many of the same factors by using its interstate
nuisance doctrine. There was no clear or express reasoning offered for
using interstate nuisance instead of equitable apportionment in the Great
Lakes disputes. Perhaps the Court instinctively recognized the challenge
of apportioning a large continuous waterbody with a low recharge rate
like the Great Lakes (and the Sparta-Memphis Aquifer) with fixed
allocations to the states. Perhaps the Court simply wanted to address the
water use and resulting harm without making an apportionment
decision. Perhaps there is little distinction between equitable
apportionment and interstate nuisance, as both doctrines involve the
same analyses and frameworks and would produce the same results. But
if the Court is concerned about using equitable apportionment in the
Sparta-Memphis Aquifer dispute, it has an ideal alternative ready that
avoids the legal errors and radical new approach to state water law
inherent in Mississippi's requested relief.
As a technical matter, interstate nuisance avoids the difficult
evidentiary and fact-determining task of quantifying the available water
supply the first step in apportioning any resource. The available water
supply of a flowing river is relatively easy to determine using observed
data, although historic flows have proven to be overly generous
374 Id. at 421.
375 See id.
376 See id.
377 See Wisconsin v. Illinois, 281 U.S. 179, 198, 201 (1930); see also Wisconsin v. Illinois,
281 U.S. 696, 697 (1930). Subsequent litigation in the Supreme Court continued over several
decades regarding Illinois's compliance with the diversion reduction schedule and the amount of
water allowed for domestic pumping, with the ultimate result being that the total allowable
diversion was increased to 3,200 cubic feet per second, the level at which it is now capped. See
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 449 U.S. 48 (1980); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 388 U.S. 426, 427 (1967);
Wisconsin v. Illinois, 289 U.S. 395 (1933).
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predictors as the climate changes. But determining the available water
supply of an aquifer requires extensive measuring and modeling, and is
at best an educated guess. Interstate nuisance avoids the question of how
much resource is available to divide and allocate, and instead focuses on
the impact and harms of the use on competing interests in the
neighboring state. Equitable apportionment requires quantification of
the natural resource, while interstate nuisance only requires
quantification of the use a far easier task with groundwater.
These technical considerations relate to a more fundamental policy
difference between equitable apportionment and interstate nuisance.
Equitable apportionment assumes that the entire resource is available
for division and allocation. This reflects the historically prevailing
values towards natural resources, which assume a goal of total
consumption and consider any remainder economic waste. Modem
conservation and preservation values, and recent concepts such as
ecosystem services, have been left out of the equitable apportionment
equation."' This can be reformed as a matter of doctrinal evolution, as
Professors J.B. Ruhl and Robert Abrams have suggested." 9 But
interstate nuisance would be a doctrinal head start on that evolutionary
path. Interstate nuisance was developed not to divide and allocate a
shared resource, but to balance harms of use and interests in
preservation of a shared resource. It has been used to limit consumptive
uses of interstate resources to protect "the environment" decades before
the term "environment" entered law and society. As values shift from
total consumption to at least some restraint and preservation, interstate
nuisance is more aligned with modem goals. The Court can apply
interstate nuisance to transboundary groundwater withdrawals, avoid
quantifying an undefined subterranean resource, and respect state
interests in conservation of resources for future generations.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Sparta-Memphis Aquifer dispute between Mississippi and
Tennessee presents the Supreme Court with an opportunity to establish
a rule and precedent for interstate groundwater disputes, which will
become more common and significant in coming years. While this is a
novel issue, the Court has been here many times before. It has been
dealing with arguments about sovereign ownership of water since the
378 See generally Robert Haskell Abrams, Broadening Narrow Perspectives and Nuisance
Law: Protecting Ecosystem Services in the Acf Basin, 22 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 243 (2007);
J.B. Ruhi, Equitable Apportionment of Ecosystem Services: New Water Law for A New Water
Age, 19 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 47 (2003).
379 See supra note 378.
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birth of the nation. And each time it has told the states the same thing:
water is unique and it cannot be "owned" by anyone, state sovereign or
otherwise. Federal law rejects state ownership of water; state law rejects
individual ownership of water. The only real question is this: how
should the Court allocate interstate groundwater resources and resolve
resulting disputes in the most equitable way?
The Court has been applying the equitable apportionment and
interstate nuisance doctrines for over a hundred years to efficiently and
fairly resolve disputes over transboundary resources between states.
There is no reason to treat groundwater differently. Absolute rules based
on physical ownership have no place in water law. Mississippi's
arguments and claims are based on a fundamentally flawed view of
water resources and the rules applicable to them. The Supreme Court
could apply its equitable apportionment doctrine to groundwater in this
and similar disputes, leaving the complex technical details to a special
master. And if the Court has concerns about that approach, the logical
alternative is application of the interstate nuisance doctrine to similarly
balance state needs and harms in an equitable fashion. Interstate
nuisance allows the Supreme Court to consider the benefits and harms
resulting from use of a shared interstate resource to determine whether
such use is reasonable, without the technical burden of quantifying the
interstate aquifer, while protecting modem conservation interests.
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